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I am pleased to present the European Union 
Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 
(EU SOCTA) 2021.
The SOCTA is Europol’s flagship report delivering 
an insight into and assessment of serious and 
organised crime in the European Union. Looking 
back at the previous iterations of the SOCTA, I can 
see a clear progression to the deeper and more 
sophisticated understanding of the serious and 
organised crime threat facing the EU presented in 
this edition.
Once more, Europol has harnessed its position 
as the nerve centre of the EU’s internal security 
architecture with its platforms, databases and 
services connecting law enforcement authorities 
across the EU and beyond.
Relying on a combination of operational insights, 
strategic intelligence and input from academia, 
the private and public sectors, the SOCTA 2021 
is a multi-disciplinary and broad assessment of 
criminal threats.
I am particularly grateful to our colleagues in 
Member States, contributing partner states 
and organisations, who have contributed more 
information for this version of the SOCTA than 
ever before.
The intelligence picture and assessment presented 
in the SOCTA 2021 is a stark reminder of the 
dynamic and adaptable adversary we face in 
serious and organised crime in the EU.
The analysis indicates that criminal structures are 
more fluid and flexible than previously thought, 
use of violence by organised crime appears to 
be increasing,  and use of corruption and abuse 
of legal business structures are key features of 
serious and organised crime activities.
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant 
impact on the serious and organised crime 
landscape in the EU. In the SOCTA 2021, we 
assess the long-term implications of these 
disruptive developments that have re-shaped 
some criminal activities and created new 
opportunities for some criminal networks. The 
SOCTA 2021 identifies key potential developments 
with an impact on serious and organised crime 
over the next four years. The outlook section 
also touches on the implications of a potential 
economic recession in the wake of the pandemic 
and how criminals will seek to capitalise on 
this. Serious and organised crime in the EU is a 
corrupting influence that seeks to infiltrate and 
undermine our economy and society.
An assessment of the criminal threats we tackle 
together also allows us to evaluate the best joint 
strategy to adopt. Europol is pioneering some 
innovative concepts such as a high-value target 
approach to fighting serious and organised crime. 
By analysing the roles played by those involved in 
organised crime, we can identify critical functions 
and individuals that constitute high-value targets. 
Targeting these critical operators and facilitators 
makes for a stronger and more disruptive law 
enforcement response. 
Europol aims to be a leader in law enforcement 
innovation. In order to remain innovative, we 
need to understand the environment in which we 
operate and the challenges we need to tackle now 
and in the future.
The SOCTA 2021 provides such insights for 
Europol, for Member State law enforcement 
authorities, and our many partners around Europe 
and beyond. I hope this assessment is of use 
to you and that it can strengthen our concerted 
efforts to tackle serious and organised crime. 
Catherine De Bolle 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR EUROPOL
“I am concerned by the impact of serious and 
organised crime on the daily lives of Europeans, 
the growth of our economy, and the strength 
and resilience of our state institutions. I am also 
concerned by the potential of these phenomena to 




Europol is the EU’s law enforcement agency and it 
assists the Member States in their fight against serious 
international crime and terrorism. Established in 
2000, Europol is at the heart of the European security 
architecture and offers a unique range of services. 
Europol is a support centre for law enforcement 
operations, a hub for information on criminal activities, 
and a focal point for law enforcement expertise. 
Analysis is central to Europol’s activities. To give 
its partners deeper insights into the crimes they are 
tackling, Europol produces regular assessments offering 
comprehensive, forward-looking analyses of crime and 
terrorism in the EU.
THE EU SOCTA 2021
The EU SOCTA 2021 is the outcome of a detailed 
analysis of the threat of serious and organised crime 
facing the EU, providing information for practitioners, 
decision-makers and the wider public. As a threat 
assessment, the SOCTA is a forward-looking document 
that assesses shifts in the serious and organised 
crime landscape. The SOCTA 2021 sets out current 
and anticipated developments across the spectrum of 
serious and organised crime, identifies the key criminal 
groups and individuals involved in criminal activities 
across the EU and describes the factors in the wider 
environment that shape serious and organised crime in 
the EU. 
The SOCTA 2021 is the most comprehensive 
and	in-depth	study	of	serious	and	organised	
crime in the EU ever undertaken.
The SOCTA 2021 provides an overview of the current 
state of knowledge on criminal networks and their 
operations based on data provided to Europol by 
Member States and partners and data collected 
specifically for the SOCTA 2021. In trying to overcome 
the established, and limiting, conceptualisation of 
organised crime groups, this assessment focuses on the 
roles of criminals within criminal processes and outlines 
how a better understanding of those roles allows for a 
more targeted operational approach in the fight against 
serious and organised crime.
Serious and organised crime represents a 
significant	threat	to	the	safety	of	EU	citizens,	
undermines communities and causes 
substantial	financial	damages	to	the	EU	and	its	
Member States. It weakens the rule of law.
In addition to victimising individual citizens, serious and 
organised crime severely affects economic development 
in Europe and beyond. Parallel underground economies 
deprive governments of income needed for investments 
in public services such as health, education and 
infrastructure. Crime has a direct negative impact on 
the quality of life of citizens in the EU and manifests in 
the shape of social exclusion, unemployment, inequality, 
sense of insecurity and the increased vulnerability of 
some groups to exploitation or recruitment.
The SOCTA is a product of close cooperation between 
Europol, the law enforcement authorities of the 
Member States and third parties such as EU agencies, 
international organisations and countries outside 
the EU with working arrangements with Europol. The 
involvement of these crucial stakeholders is also 
reflected in the SOCTA’s role as the cornerstone of 
the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Crime 
Threats (EMPACT) in the EU.
BACKGROUND
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THE SOCTA METHODOLOGY
As part of an iterative process, the SOCTA methodology(1) 
has been further developed and refined by experts 
at Europol and from the law enforcement authorities 
of the Member States. The SOCTA methodology 
allows Europol to understand and assess serious and 
organised crime holistically. The SOCTA analyses and 
describes criminal markets and crime areas in the EU; 
the criminal networks or individual criminals carrying 
out these criminal activities; as well as the factors in the 
broader environment that shape the nature of serious 
and organised crime in the EU. Europol uses a mixed 
method approach involving qualitative and quantitative 
analysis techniques and a set of clearly defined 
indicators, to identify and specify the most threatening 
criminal phenomena in the EU. Europol arrives at the 
recommended priorities for the fight against serious and 
organised crime for EMPACT based on this methodology. 
The SOCTA methodology ensures transparency and 
reliability providing decision-makers with a solid basis for 
their deliberations.
More information on the SOCTA methodology is available 
in Annex I.
DATA AND SOURCES
The findings of the SOCTA 2021 are the outcome of 
detailed analysis of intelligence gathered as part of the 
largest data collection on serious and organised crime 
ever undertaken in the EU. Europol relied heavily on the 
operational intelligence held in its databases on serious 
and organised crime to provide a thorough and extensive 
analysis of the criminal threats facing the EU.
Member	States,	cooperation	partners	outside	
the EU and institutional partners contributed 
almost 4 000 questionnaires on criminal 
activities and criminal networks.
The amount of data provided for the SOCTA 2021 has 
increased by around 60 % compared to the SOCTA 2017. 
STRUCTURE
The SOCTA opens with an analysis of the criminal 
networks and individual criminal actors active across the 
EU and provides information on cross-cutting issues that 
have an impact on or create the conditions for all 
criminal activities across the serious and organised 
crime landscape. These issues include corruption, money 
laundering and criminal content online. Key locations for 
crime in the EU are also presented.
The second chapter lists key developments, criminals 
and criminal networks, routes, locations and modi 
operandi for each of the criminal activities and criminal 
markets that make up serious and organised crime in the 
EU. Throughout the document, case examples highlight 
the real impact of serious and organised crime across 
the EU and demonstrate the success of international law 
enforcement cooperation. 
The SOCTA 2021 closes by presenting a set of 
recommended priorities. Based on the outcome 
of a comprehensive analysis of the indicators and 
factors detailed in the SOCTA methodology, Europol 
recommends key priorities to tackle the most threatening 
forms of serious and organised crime.
EMPACT
EMPACT provides a robust framework that brings 
together the law enforcement authorities of the Member 
States, Europol and a wide range of multi-disciplinary 
partners in the fight against serious and organised crime. 
EMPACT translates strategic objectives at European 
level into concrete operational actions against serious 
and organised crime.
EMPACT is an instrument adopted by the European 
Union in 2010 to address the most significant criminal 
threats facing the EU. It optimises coordination and 
cooperation on the crime priorities agreed by all Member 
States. During the cycle, all concerned services and 
stakeholders, at national and EU level, are invited to 
allocate resources and mutually reinforce efforts. 
Considering the rapidly evolving nature of crime, Europol 
also prepares a mid-term review of new, changing or 
emerging threats, in cooperation with Member States 
and relevant EU agencies.
Relying on the analytical findings of the SOCTA 2021 and 
considering other strategic papers, assessments and 
policies, the Council will decide on the priorities in the 
fight against serious and organised crime for EMPACT 
from 2022 to 2025. These priorities will determine 
the operational work carried out in the framework of 
EMPACT for the next four years. The crime priorities 
agreed at European level in the context of EMPACT are 
reflected in operational activities at Member State level.
1  Council of the European Union 2019, SOCTA 2021 Methodology (13732/19).
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KEY FINDINGS 
Serious and organised crime remains a key 
threat to the internal security of the EU. All 
criminal activities assessed in the EU SOCTA 
2021 have a serious impact on the EU. 
However, certain phenomena are particularly 
threatening and require urgent concerted 
action to address them.
 
The organised crime landscape is characterised 
by a networked environment where cooperation 
between criminals is fluid, systematic and driven 
by a profit-oriented focus. Several key actors 
cooperate in criminal networks with service 
providers and brokers in pivotal roles. 
 
Similar to a business environment, the 
core of a criminal network is composed of 
managerial layers and field operators. This 
core is surrounded by a range of actors 
linked to the crime infrastructure providing 
support services, such as brokers, document 
fraudsters, technical experts, legal and 




A key characteristic of criminal networks, once 
more confirmed by the pandemic, is their agility 
in adapting to and capitalising on changes in the 
environment in which they operate. Obstacles 
become criminal opportunities and may be as 
simple as adapting the narrative of a known 
modus operandi.
The use of violence by criminals involved in 
serious and organised crime in the EU appears 
to have been increasing in terms of the 
frequency of use and its severity. Criminals 
use violence indiscriminately and target 
victims without regard for their involvement 
or standing, often accepting harm to innocent 
bystanders. The threat from violent incidents 
has been augmented by the frequent use of 
firearms or explosives in public.
Corruption is a feature of most, if not all, criminal 
activities in the EU. Corruption takes place at 
all levels of society and can range from petty 
bribery to complex multi-million-euro corruption 
schemes. Corruption erodes the rule of law, 
weakens institutions of states and hinders 
economic development. Corruption is a key threat 
to be addressed in the fight against serious and 
organised crime. Almost 60 % of the criminal 




SERIOUS AND ORGANISED 
CRIME IN THE EU
2     Based on SOCTA 2021 data analysis.
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The scale and complexity of money 
laundering activities in the EU have 
previously been underestimated. 
Serious and organised crime in the EU 
fundamentally relies on the ability to launder 
vast amounts of criminal profits. For this 
purpose, professional money launderers 
have established a parallel underground 
financial system to process transactions 
and payments isolated from any oversight 
mechanisms governing the legal financial 
system. This parallel system ensures that 
the criminal proceeds cannot be traced as 
part of a sophisticated criminal economy.
Legal business structures such as companies 
or other entities are used to facilitate virtually 
all types of criminal activity with an impact 
on the EU. Criminals directly control or 
infiltrate legal business structures in order to 
facilitate their criminal activities. All types of 
legal businesses are potentially vulnerable to 
exploitation by serious and organised crime. 
More than 80 % of the criminal networks 
active in the EU use legal business structures 
for their criminal activities. About half of 
all criminal networks set up their own legal 
business structures or infiltrate businesses at 
a high level.
The use of technology is a key feature 
of serious and organised crime in 
2021. Criminals exploit encrypted 
communications to network among 
each other, use social media and instant 
messaging services to reach a larger 
audience to advertise illegal goods or 
to spread disinformation. The online 
environment and online trade provide 
criminals access to expertise and 




The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant 
impact on the serious and organised crime 
landscape in the EU. Criminals were quick 
to adapt illegal products, modi operandi and 
narratives in order to exploit the fear and 
anxieties of Europeans and to capitalise on 
the scarcity of some vital goods during the 
pandemic. While some criminal activities will 
or have returned to their pre-pandemic state, 
others will be fundamentally changed by the 
COVID-19 pandemic.
A potential deep economic recession 
following the COVID-19 pandemic will 
fundamentally shape serious and organised 
crime in the EU for the near future. Previous 
periods of economic stress can provide 
some degree of insight into how these 
developments might affect crime in the EU 
and what responses need to be formulated 
to counter existing and emerging threats to 
the EU’s internal security during this time.
Serious and organised crime deeply affects 
all layers of society; in addition to the direct 
impact on the daily lives of EU citizens, it also 
undermines the economy, state institutions 




Over 80 % of the reported criminal 
networks are involved in the trade 
in drugs, organised property crime,  
excise fraud, THB, online and other 
frauds or migrant smuggling.  
Nearly half of these are involved  
in the drugs trade (38 %)(3).
 
The trade in illegal drugs continues to dominate 
serious and organised crime in the EU in terms 
of the number of criminals and criminal networks 
involved as well as the vast amounts of criminal 
profits generated as part of the production, 
trafficking and distribution of illegal drugs. Much 
of the violence associated with serious and 
organised crime is related to the trade in drugs. 
 
Unprecedented quantities 
of  cocaine  are trafficked to 
the EU from Latin America, 
generating multi-billion-euro 
profits for the diverse range 
of criminals involved in the cocaine trade in both 
Europe and South America. The trade in cocaine 
fuels criminal enterprises that use their enormous 
resources to infiltrate and undermine the EU’s 
economy, public institutions and society. 
 
 
Similarly, the trade in  
 cannabis   is ubiquitous in 
the EU, affecting all Member 
States. Large amounts of 
cannabis are trafficked to the 
EU each year and EU-based criminals orchestrate 
the large-scale indoor and outdoor cultivation of 








Criminal networks have been 
increasing their capacities 
for the production and 
distribution of  synthetic drugs.  
European producers of these 
substances are among the most prolific criminal 
entrepreneurs worldwide, cooperating with 
criminal partners on a global scale in the sourcing 
of (pre-)precursor substances and the distribution 
of manufactured drugs.
The threat from cyber-dependent crime has 
been increasing over the last years, not only in 
terms of the number of attacks reported but 
also in terms of the sophistication of attacks. 
Cyber-dependent crime is likely significantly 
underreported. The rapidly progressing 
digitalisation of society and the economy 
constantly creates new opportunities for 
criminals involved in cyber-dependent crime. 
 
There has been a continuous 
increase in activities related to  
 online child sexual abuse  
over recent years. Online child 
sexual abuse likely remains 
highly underreported. Many victims remain 
unidentified and their abusers undetected.
KEY CRIME THREATS TO THE EU
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The market for  migrant 
smuggling  services has 
been sustained despite the 
consolidation in migration 
flows reaching the EU since the 
height of the migratory crisis.   
Facilitation of entry in the EU  fluctuates in line 
with the changing entry routes, whereas facilitation 
of secondary movements and legalisation of stay 
is less visible but equally profitable for criminal 
networks.The recklessness of criminal networks 
is clearly illustrated in this criminal activity. 
Irregular migrants are exposed to high fees for 
services that increasingly violate their physical 
and psychological integrity during the journey. 
In addition, they are often vulnerable to further 
exploitation upon arrival.
 
Several steps in the criminal 
process of 	trafficking	in	human	
beings,	 such as recruitment of 
victims and advertisement of 
services, have moved almost 
entirely to the online domain. 
The boundary between victim and accomplice has 
become blurred, with female victims also taking 
up organisational roles and with seemingly formal 
business agreements preventing victims from 
identifying as such. 
The overall number of 
incidents of  organised 
property crime  remains 
high, especially for domestic 
burglaries, with more than 
one million cases a year, 
directly affecting millions of people. Mobile 
organised crime groups (MOCGs) continue 
to travel long distances from region to region 
and country to country committing organised 
property crime. The MOCGs easily shift from 
domestic burglaries to burglaries targeting 
business premises, physical ATM attacks, fraud 
schemes, cargo crime, pickpocketing, shoplifting 





As part of excise fraud, 
illicit tobacco products  are 
increasingly produced in 
the EU, in modern and more 
professional production facilities, established 
closer to destination markets.  
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A MODERN HYDRA: 
SERIOUS AND ORGANISED 
CRIME IN THE EU
EU citizens enjoy some of the highest levels of prosperity 
and security in the world. However, the EU still faces 
serious challenges to its internal security, which threaten 
to undo some of our common achievements and 
undermine shared European values and ambitions. As 
the EU is facing the COVID-19 pandemic, one of the most 
significant crises since the end of World War II, criminals 
seek to exploit this extraordinary situation targeting 
citizens, business and public institutions alike.
Along with terrorism, serious and organised crime 
continues to constitute the most pressing internal 
security challenge to the EU. Serious and organised crime 
encompasses a diverse range of criminal phenomena, 
from the trade in illegal drugs to crimes such as migrant 
smuggling and the trafficking in human beings (THB), 
economic and financial crime and many more.
The SOCTA 2021 provides an analysis of the nature 
and the scope of the challenge facing the EU. A better 
understanding of serious and organised crime will equip 
law enforcement authorities, policy- and decision-makers 
with better tools to counter these phenomena. 
ORGANISED CRIME IS SIMPLE - AND 
COMPLICATED
Little has changed in what drives individuals to band 
together in organised criminal ventures: the desire to 
accumulate wealth by whatever means necessary. The 
profit-motive shapes crime schemes, drives cooperation 
and competition, and dictates risk-benefit considerations. 
Organised crime is the domain of ruthless operators 
constantly seeking to identify and exploit vulnerabilities 
in our societies, economies, and laws. While its 
underlying motivations may not have changed, the 
structures, modi operandi and criminal operators 
encountered in fighting organised crime have undergone 
remarkable changes highlighting the versatility and 
flexibility of criminality.
4  Encyclopaedia Britannica 2021, Hydra – Greek mythology, accessible at https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hydra-Greek-mythology
A MODERN HYDRA
Law enforcement authorities have invested considerable 
resources to tackle this insidious form of crime. 
However, the flexible and changing nature of organised 
crime has allowed it to elude dismantlement and 
prolonged disruption. Serious and organised crime in 
the 21st century, in particular, is fluid and networked, 
connecting individual criminal entrepreneurs and 
smaller groups of criminals mediated by information 
and contract brokers and supported by criminal service 
providers lending advice and assistance with expertise in 
law, finance, logistics and many other specialist domains.
Hydra,	in	Greek	legend,	a	gigantic	water-snake-
like	monster	with	nine	heads,	one	of	which	was	
immortal. Anyone who attempted to behead 
the Hydra found that as soon as one head was 
cut	off,	two	more	heads	would	emerge	from	
the fresh wound(4).  
Encyclopaedia Britannica
The experience of law enforcement authorities have 
shown that even successful and far-reaching disruption 
of criminal networks has little long-term consequence for 
the overall activities of organised crime. Like the Hydra 
of Greek mythology, removing one head does not kill the 
monster.
THE INSTRUMENTS OF SERIOUS AND 
ORGANISED CRIME
Criminals are adept at exploiting opportunities and 
turning others’ crises into their fortune. Violence, 
corruption and deception are the key tools at their 
disposal. 
The use of violence by criminals involved in serious 
and organised crime in the EU appears to have been 
increasing in terms of the frequency of use and its 
15
EU SERIOUS AND ORGANISED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021
severity. Criminals use violence indiscriminately and 
target victims without regard for their involvement or 
standing, often accepting harm to innocent bystanders. 
The threat from violent incidents has been augmented by 
the frequent use of firearms or explosives in public.
Corruption is a feature of most, if not all, criminal 
activities in the EU. Corruption takes place at all levels 
of society and can range from petty bribery to complex 
multi-million-euro corruption schemes. Corruption 
erodes the rule of law, weakens institutions of states and 
hinders economic development.
Organised crime undermines our economies, society and 
the institutions of state. The investment of billions of 
euros in illegal profits generated by organised crime in 
the EU in our licit economy distort competition and hinder 
economic development. Professional money launderers 
have established a parallel underground financial system 
to process transactions and payments isolated from 
any oversight mechanisms governing the legal financial 
system. This parallel system ensures that the criminal 
proceeds cannot be traced as part of a sophisticated 
criminal economy.
Criminals are highly adept at exploiting our economy 
for their purposes. Legal business structures such as 
companies or other entities are used to facilitate virtually 
all types of criminal activity with an impact on the EU. 
Criminals directly control or infiltrate legal business 
structures in order to facilitate their criminal activities. 
All types of legal businesses are potentially vulnerable 
to exploitation by serious and organised crime. More 
than 80 % of the criminal networks active in the EU use 
legal business structures for their criminal activities. 
About half of all criminal networks set up their own legal 
business structures or infiltrate businesses at a high 
level.
Criminals are digital natives. Virtually all criminal 
activities now feature some online component, and 
some phenomena have fully migrated online. Online 
marketpleaces, both on the surface and dark web, 
offer access to illicit goods and illicit services. Digital 
platforms provide access to encrypted communications 
and payment solutions.  
IDENTIFYING THE MOST RELEVANT  
CRIME THREATS 
All serious and organised crime phenomena are threats 
to the EU’s internal security.  The large majority (80 %) 
of criminal activities perpetrated by criminal networks  
involve drugs, organised property crime, various types 
of frauds, and crimes exploiting people as a commodity. 
These types of serious and organised crime 
were identified as particularly menacing based on an 
assessment of their threat, impact, and future evolution.
The trade in  cocaine, cannabis, synthetic drugs and new 
psychoactive substances (NPS) is a key threat to the 
EU due to the levels of violence associated, the multi-
billion euro profits generated and the substantial harm 
caused by it. Mobile Organised Crime Groups (MOCGs) 
active in burglaries throughout the EU victimise millions 
of EU citizens. Various fraud schemes generate multi-
billion euro profits and significantly undermine the EU’s 
economy.  The COVID-19 pandemic has acted as a 
catalyst for the emergence of new online fraud schemes.  
The trafficking in human beings is a key threat to the 
EU.  Several parts of the trafficking process have moved 
online, from recruitment of victims to advertisement of 
illicit services.  Criminal networks profit from the despair 
of irregular migrants, charging high fees to smuggle 
them into or within the EU, or assist them in obtaining 
legal residence status. 
Cybercrime is often perpetrated by individual criminals 
and remains significantly underreported.  Cyberattacks 
have increased and have become more sophisticated. 
Online child sexual exploitation targets the most 
vulberable members of our society. Illicit waste 
trafficking increasingly takes places in the EU in addition 
to locations outside of Europe.
All crime areas discussed in the SOCTA 2021 represent 
considerable challenges to the EU.  All forms of serious 
and organised crime deeply affect society and often have 
a direct and detrimental impact on the daily lives of EU 
citizens. These crime phenomena exert their corrupting 
influence to undermine the EU’s economy, institutions of 
state and the rule of law.  
The current crisis situation and the potential economic 
and social fallout threaten to create ideal conditions for 
the spread of organised crime in the EU. Criminals were 
already quick to adapt illegal products, modi operandi 
and narratives to the COVID-19 pandemic.  In this way, 
they exploited the fear and anxieties of Europeans and 
profited from the scarcity of some vital goods during 
the pandemic.  A potential deep economic recession 
following the COVID-19 pandemic may facilitate the 
growth of serious and organised crime in the EU.  
Entrepreneurial and ruthless criminal operators may 
further exploit existing vulnerabilities and turn them into 
opportunities for criminal involvement.
Serious and organised crime is a strong and resilient 
adversary representing a modern Hydra. This adversary 
can only be fought using a joint, concerted, and multi-
disciplinary approach grounded in our common European 
values and the respect for fundamental rights.
16
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Organised crime is often described from the viewpoint 
of criminal activities. These activities can be measured 
and tackled relying on law enforcement expertise specific 
to different law enforcement domains such as the fight 
against drug trafficking, migrant smuggling or money 
laundering, among many others. However, the fight 
against organised crime ultimately needs to target the 
criminals and their networks who engage in criminal 
activities. 
Understanding how criminals and criminal networks 
operate will allow law enforcement to more effectively 
identify and disrupt criminal operations. The most 
recent data used in the analysis for the SOCTA 2021 
reveal that the serious and organised crime landscape 
is characterised by a networked environment where 
cooperation between criminals is fluid, systemic and 
profit-oriented. Criminals cooperate in the framework 
of criminal networks engaging with criminal service 
providers and brokers who occupy pivotal roles in the 
crime landscape. 
Over 80 % of the reported criminal networks 
are	involved	in	the	trade	in	drugs,	organised	
property	crime,	excise	fraud,	THB,	online	 
and other frauds or migrant smuggling. Nearly 
half of these are involved in the drugs trade  
(38 %). 
Despite an increasing number of investigations into 
cyber-dependent crimes and other cybercrime activities, 
the number of criminal networks is low. One of the 
reasons could be that cybercrime involves many 
criminals operating individually and not in the framework 
of established networks. 
Around 40 % of the criminal networks active in the EU 
engage in more than one main criminal activity. 
A quarter of the criminal groups have been active for 
more than ten years. A third of the criminal networks has 
been active for less than three years. 
The nature of organised crime is truly global. 
More than 180 nationalities are involved in 
organised crime activities in the EU. 65 % of the 
criminal groups active in the EU are composed 
of members of multiple nationalities. 
More than 50 % of all reported suspected organised 
criminals active in the EU are non-EU nationals. Half of 
these non-EU nationals originate from countries in the 
EU’s neighbourhood, such as the Western Balkan region, 
eastern European countries, and North Africa. 
A majority of criminal networks (around  
60 %) employ violence as part of their criminal 
businesses. 
Around a quarter of criminal networks routinely use 
violence and intimidation in an offensive, planned, 
premeditated way. In some cases, these criminal 
networks make use of hitmen and kidnappers providing 
services of murder and intimidation or of enforcers and 
bodyguards. In some extortion cases, criminal networks 
hire members of other criminal networks to execute 
violent attacks when victims deny payment.
Almost 70 % of criminal networks are active in 
more than three countries.
TYPES OF ORGANISED CRIME
Different types of criminal networks are often clustered 
according to indicators such as:
 • nationality or ethnicity (e.g. Chinese organised crime 
groups); 
 • criminal activity (e.g. MOCGs involved in property 
crime); 
 • structure (e.g. mafia-style OCGs, street gangs);
 • or any other descriptive characteristic of criminal 
networks (such as value systems, e.g. outlaw 
motorcycle gangs and thieves-in-law).
CRIMINAL NETWORKS AND 
CRIMINAL ENTREPRENEURS:  
A COMPLEX LANDSCAPE
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Nationality, ethnicity, activity, structure or other 
descriptive indicators are often used to describe and 
classify criminal networks. However, such approaches 
are often reductive and do not necessarily highlight the 
most characterising element of the network. 
In some cases, classifying criminal networks according 
to national or even ethnic homogeneity can be relevant 
for an investigation, because the nationality and/or 
ethnicity can be an important element in international 
collaboration. Strategically, the division of criminal 
groups according to ethnic homogeneity often lacks 
nuance. Almost two thirds of the criminal groups 
reported for the SOCTA 2021 are composed of members 
of different nationalities.
CAPTURING THE COMPLEXITY OF THE 
CRIMINAL LANDSCAPE
When analysing organised crime groups beyond the 
typical descriptive indicators such as nationality, criminal 
activity or common characteristics, in many cases the 
analysis reveals a fragmented landscape of different 
networks of collaborating individuals and groups. 
These actors interact with one another in the pursuit 
of common criminal objectives. This makes criminal 
operations more complex than if they were organised 
end-to-end by a single group. Moreover, at various points 
in the criminal process chain, criminals can operate in or 
provide services to several different networks. 
Criminal networks are composed of contacts interacting 
with one another on a more permanent or ad hoc basis. 
Networks vary in size. Smaller networks often operate at 
a regional or local level, relying on autonomous partners. 
In many cases, these partners provide their services to 
multiple networks at the same time. Larger networks 
typically operate at an international level and are involved 
in more complex operations.
The majority of the groups are loose networks 
or	centre	around	a	core	group	(60	%),	while	 
40 % are hierarchically structured. 
The increasing presence of loose and more organic 
networks is also a reflection of the increasing 
proliferation of the crime-as-a-service business model, 
which sees criminal networks and individual criminal 
5 HVTs are those suspects with a critical role within a criminal network whose identification and arrest would seriously damage the criminal 
network and the criminal activities it is involved in.
entrepreneurs offer criminal activities as a service to 
others. Crime-as-a-service is a broad concept and may 
involve the delivery of any criminal services, ranging from 
the provision of technical cybercrime applications to 
money-laundering services.
In order to capture the full complexity and flexible nature 
of modern organised crime networks, other elements 
should be taken into account. This includes the roles 
occupied by individuals and groups in the networks, 
ad hoc collaboration, changing partnerships and 
cooperation between criminals of many nationalities. 
This can be used to guide an operational approach to 
identify weaknesses in criminal networks and high-value 
targets (HVTs)(5).
Focusing on the roles and crime infrastructure can 
also highlight the impact and importance of the actors 
involved in criminal activities. This approach allows for 
the identification of HVTs involved in criminal operations. 
HVTs may be embedded in a criminal network or operate 
independently, providing vital criminal services as money 
brokers, hitmen, lawyers, accountants, information 
and contact brokers, document forgers, providers of 
technical/encryption solutions, among others.
DEVELOPING A CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL 
PROCESSES
The process steps of a criminal activity are determined 
by the nature of the crime, such as the need to move 
physical goods or persons or to exploit infrastructures. 
Most criminal activities entail three major consecutive 
process steps linked to the core activity:
 • production/recruitment/acquisition;
 • transport of persons/physical goods;
 • exploitation of persons/distribution of the goods;
as well as two supporting process steps which can be 
performed subsequently or concurrently by actors in the 
criminal infrastructure:
 • handling the money flow;
 • the use of facilitating services including corruption.
The handling of the money flows and the use of 
facilitating services are transversal processes. Often they 
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are offered as criminal expertise, which is not always 
available within the criminal group. 
Criminal activities such as cybercrime and fraud often 
do not entail the transport of goods and consist of only 
three process steps: acquisition, the handling of money 
and the use of facilitating services.
Groups counting more than 100 members are mostly 
based on family or clan structures such as Italian mafia 
clans or criminal groups originating from traveller 
communities. Other larger groups are often constituted 
around a common value system such as outlaw 
motorcycle gangs or thieves-in-law. 
A SERVICE-ORIENTED CRIMINAL 
ECONOMY
Money laundering is an essential component of the 
vast majority of criminal operations. Most groups and 
networks (68 %) use basic money laundering methods 
such as investing in property or high-value goods. Some 
rely on slightly more sophisticated methods such as the 
use of cash-intensive businesses. 
Money laundering service providers and 
networks are mainly required to regularly 
launder large amounts of criminal proceeds 
using sophisticated and innovative schemes. 
32	%	of	OCGs	have	access	to	and	make	use	of	
these services. 
In many cases, service providers enable access to 
a parallel banking system which allows criminals to 
transfer money to associates across the world.
Many illegal money brokers and bankers constitute 
HVTs as they are crucial in enabling money transfers and 
provide services to different clients. Tackling them will 
cause disruption in several process chains.
Brokers or intermediaries are crucial in 
connecting	networks,	individual	criminals	and	




They also facilitate access to informants, hitmen, 
document forgers and other criminal specialists. 
Eliminating a broker can disrupt criminal operations and 
even whole criminal networks. 
Low-level facilitators are not embedded within the core 
criminal groups in the criminal networks, but are external 
actors who facilitate part of the criminal process for 
financial gain. They can take on roles such as informants, 
strawpersons, money mules, sailors, pilots, bus drivers, 
students and fake spouses. In some cases, risk 
indicators can highlight straw owners who have dozens 
of vehicles or companies registered in their name. Acting 
on these straw owners can be a first step towards the 
detection, investigation and tackling of organised crime. 
In some cases, these facilitators are coerced through 
deception, extortion and violence. 
Almost 60 % of the criminal groups reported 
for the SOCTA 2021 engage in corruption. 
Many use corruption only occasionally, but a smaller 
proportion of criminal networks engages in frequent 
and proactive corruption targeting public servants or 
specific sectors as an intrinsic part of their business 
strategy. Individuals at all levels of society are targeted 
for corruption. 
Complicit legal and financial advisors as well as lawyers 
and notaries provide information to criminals on police 
records and criminal proceedings and assist in setting 
up fraud schemes and networks of companies to acquire 
and launder money. They provide advice in setting up 
shell companies, foundations, trusts and also sometimes 
facilitate the takeover of legitimate companies to be 
used for criminal ends. When genuine, they can be 
important partners in the fight against organised crime.
More than 80 % of the criminal networks active 
in the EU use legal business structures for their 
criminal activities. 
About half of all criminal networks set up their own legal 
business structures or infiltrate businesses at a high 
level.
Legal business structures can be used as tools to 
carry out core criminal activities, such as using waste 
management companies for waste and pollution crimes. 
In other cases, legal business structures are used as 
shell companies for money laundering purposes and 
other support functions.
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 CRITICAL ROLES IN CRIMINAL 
NETWORKS: HIGH-VALUE TARGETS  
 
By analysing the roles played by 
those involved in organised crime, 
we can identify critical functions and 
individuals that constitute HVTs. 
Targeting these critical operators 
and facilitators makes for a stronger 
and more disruptive law enforcement 
response. HVTs are key enablers and 
facilitators of criminal processes. 
They are not limited to the obvious 
categories of leaders, organisers, 
brokers, coordinators, fencers or 
large-scale money launderers. They 
can also be persons offering specialist 
expertise or access to crucial contacts 
or infrastructures such as technical 
experts, legal and financial advisors 
or service providers. Tackling these 
criminal collaborators will maximise 




The use of violence  
While consolidated figures quantifying the number 
of violent incidents related to serious and organised 
crime are not available, the level of the use of violence 
associated with serious and organised criminality is 
perceived to have increased notably, both in terms of 
frequency and severity, over the last four years. 
Violence in illicit markets is often a sign of growing 
competition (e.g. over the control of lucrative distribution 
networks or a particular geographic territory). Shifting 
power balances within or between competing organised 
crime groups, the impact of law enforcement efforts, or 
broader economic pressures can also generate violence.
Perpetrating violence on behalf of a criminal client is 
increasingly being marketed as a service, often via 
dark web platforms and encrypted communication 
applications. The violent acts on offer range from threats, 
intimidation, vandalism and assaults, to kidnapping, 
torture, mutilation and murder.
Violence is casually discussed and negotiated between 
criminals seeking violence as a service. The commission 
of violent acts is increasingly becoming a stand-alone 
business in the criminal environment. This increasingly 
diversified business model generates volatile trading 
relationships, and in turn heightens the sense of distrust 
among the service-oriented participants – leading to 
further competition and violence. 
As part of this development, violence may become more 
common to traditionally non-violent criminal activities 
such as excise fraud or cybercrime.
Perpetrating violence on behalf of a criminal 
client is increasingly being marketed as a 
service,	often	via	dark	web	platforms	and	
encrypted communication applications. 
The violent acts on offer range from threats, intimidation, 
vandalism and assaults, to kidnapping, torture, mutilation 
and murder.
Violence is employed by criminal networks for a variety 
of reasons against external parties such as competitors 
as well as non-criminals (e.g. witnesses and their 
solicitors, law enforcement and court officers). Internally, 
criminal networks employ violence against group 
members or their relatives.
Internal violence is mostly used to ensure discipline 
and to settle conflicts, to punish whistle-blowers and 
transgressions against the group’s rules or for failed 
operations. In other cases, violence is used against 
incarcerated members of the group or their families, to 
intimidate them into not disclosing information. Internal 
violence can also be used for extortion within the group. 
Internal violence may target members at all levels – 
from lower ranking members and associates (e.g. drug 
couriers, strawmen, money mules, or other facilitators) 
to the most senior members as a result of the loss of a 
commodity or an internal struggle. 
External violence is often employed against competing 
criminal groups, business partners or criminal service 
providers. Violence among rival groups or competitors 
is frequently reported in connection with drug trafficking 
(especially trafficking of heroin and cannabis), migrant 
smuggling and among criminal groups involved in THB. 
In some cases, the aim is not only to ensure control 
over a criminal market, but to dismantle rival criminal 
networks. 
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UNDERWORLD PRISON WITH 
TORTURE CHAMBER 
 
In June 2020, the Dutch Police arrested 
six men suspected of planning 
kidnappings. The police discovered a 
warehouse containing seven maritime 
shipping containers that had been 
converted into cells and a torture 
chamber. The criminals had shared 
photos of one container equipped with 
a dental chair complete with straps 
on the armrests and footrest. Other 
torture instruments were visible in 
the photos. The containers had also 
been soundproofed. The upcoming 
kidnappings seemed to be prepared 
with great precision. The criminal 
network comprised several teams 
(including an observation team) and 
had stored weapons, police clothing, 





Date: 7 July 2020
 
Violence may also be used to show dissatisfaction with 
the quality of an illicit commodity or a criminal service, or 
simply as a favour or service to a criminal associate.
 
Legal business structures: 
key tools for organised crime
Criminals and criminal networks use legitimate business 
structures, such as companies or other legal entities, 
to enable or obscure criminal activities. Virtually all 
types of criminal activity in the area of serious and 
organised crime can potentially entail the abuse of legal 
business structures. Criminals infiltrate existing business 
structures to take advantage of the façade of legitimacy 
and evade law enforcement attention. Criminal groups 
also set up ad hoc businesses (i.e. ‘front’ or ‘shell’ 
companies) and use them to infiltrate the legal market. 
The abuse of legal businesses can be systematic and 
long-term, or temporary and occasional. Sometimes the 
owner(s) of the legal business are also members of the 
criminal network and directly benefit from illicit activities. 
In other cases, legal businesses engage with criminals 
in a crime-as-a-service arrangement of cooperation. 
Criminal groups also infiltrate businesses by introducing 
criminal associates to the staff. 
Legal business structures are also commonly used to 
launder the criminal proceeds and re-introduce them into 
the financial system. Money service businesses, offshore 
companies and cash-intensive businesses involved in 
hospitality and retail, among other sectors, are frequently 
used to move and launder illicit profits. Currency 
exchanges are used to integrate criminal proceeds into 
the legal economy.
The COVID-19 pandemic may be followed by an 
economic recession. It is likely that criminals will 
exploit vulnerabilities in the economy to infiltrate legal 
businesses in order to facilitate their criminal activities. 
This may entail loaning funds to struggling businesses 
and making them dependent on criminal financiers or 
directly buying up companies in financial difficulties.
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Links between serious 
and organised crime and 
terrorism
Both terrorist and criminal groups operate outside 
the law and share the aim of eluding law enforcement 
authorities. However, their core motivations remain 
largely divergent: while organised crime seeks profit 
above all else, terrorists largely pursue political or 
ideological aims. In the EU, there is little evidence of 
systematic cooperation between criminals and terrorists. 
In addition, criminals are thought to be reluctant to 
cooperate with terrorists because of the attention 
such cooperation might attract from intelligence and 
law enforcement services. When it occurs, interaction 
between criminal and terrorist groups is mostly 
transaction-based. 




shared pool of potential recruits.
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ORGANISED CRIME  
UNDERMINES SOCIETIES
6 Corruptie.org 2021, What is corruption, accessible at http://www.corruptie.org/en/corruption/what-is-corruption/
7 European Commission 2017, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs 2017, Special Eurobarometer 470, accessible at  
https://op.europa.eu/nl/publication-detail/-/publication/531fa14f-2b2b-11e8-b5fe-01aa75ed71a1/language-en; 
Contribution for the SOCTA 2021: European Commission (DG Home and DG TAXUD).
Corruption
Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private 
gain(6). Corruption can take the form of bribery, influence 
peddling, nepotism, and abuse of authority, among 
others. As an enabler for crime and terrorism, corruption 
constitutes a threat to security. It is also detrimental to 
economic growth as it creates business uncertainty and 
imposes additional costs(7). Corruption also undermines 
the effective running of state institutions and negatively 
impacts citizens’ interactions with their governments and 
civil societies.
Corruption is an integral element of almost every 
organised crime activity. It is used to gain influence and 
to infiltrate private and public sector organisations. 
Criminals	use	corruption	to	influence	






Though widespread, corruption is insidious and 
often invisible. Presumed chronic under-reporting of 
corruption makes it difficult to evaluate the phenomenon 
as a criminal threat. The underlying mechanics of 
corruption have not changed over time. However, the 
means by which it is implemented reflects changes in 
technology and society. For instance, cryptocurrencies 
are increasingly used to make payments to corrupt 
officials and for money-laundering purposes. In addition, 
the digitalisation of public administration will lead to 
the increased targeting of individuals within companies 
and public services who can manipulate processes and 
decisions in digital systems or can otherwise facilitate 
access to valuable information.
Criminal finances and money 
laundering
Money laundering is the legalisation of criminally 
acquired funds derived from all profit-motivated crime. 
Money laundering was traditionally a parallel activity to 
a predicate offence – enabling criminals and terrorist 
groups to hide the sources of illicit income and assets. 
However, large-scale money laundering has evolved 
into complex schemes that are offered as services by 
specialised groups to other criminals for a fee. 
Money laundering has a significant impact across a 
number of areas. Not only does the parallel economy of 
money laundering allow criminal structures to expand, 
it also causes considerable losses to public revenue, as 
well as other negative consequences such as infiltration 
into legitimate business, distortion of competition and 
the free market environment, compromise of business 
structures and exposing business sectors to risk, and 
jeopardising financial institutions with the potential of 
affecting entire financial systems. 
Since financial gain is the primary motivation behind 
almost all forms of serious and organised crime, the 
laundering of illicit proceeds forms an integral part of 
criminal infrastructures. Money laundering enables 
criminal networks to legitimise or conceal their assets 
from law enforcement, make profits and reinvest illicit 
funds into further criminality or terrorism. Both supply 
and demand in the area of money laundering are high, 
with demand being driven by the rate of profit and also 




due to serious intelligence gaps on criminal 
turnover	and	profits.	 
 
Money laundering can range from self-laundering 
schemes to sophisticated, large-scale laundering 
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ITALIAN OPERATION ARRESTS TEN MEMBERS OF AN ORGANISED CRIME GROUP 
 
An international operation successfully dismantled an organised crime group which was 
suspected of money laundering and illegally trading gold. Ten members of the targeted 
organised crime group were arrested and four arrest warrants were issued for criminals in 
Romania and Turkey. The members of the organised crime group originated from China, 
Italy, Romania and Turkey. During the operation, the Guardia di Finanza seized  
EUR 260 000. In addition, the Judge for Preliminary Investigations in Bologna ordered the 
freezing of EUR 7.4 million in assets.
The aim of the operation was to dismantle the group, which was active in international 
money laundering. The Guardia di Finanza had been collecting evidence against the group 
for two years. The investigation led to the seizure of over 70 kg of gold (valued at EUR 
2.5 million) and EUR 1.5 million in cash. The main target, a 50-year-old Turkish national, 
collected cash from Chinese business people wishing to commit tax evasion. He invested 
the collected cash and bought gold, which he traded on the legal gold market. He then 
transferred the profits to bank accounts in Romania and Turkey, and eventually to bank 
accounts in the UK owned by the Chinese criminals who led the crime group.
Source: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/italian-operation-arrests-ten-
members-of-organised-crime-group 
Date: 13 December 2018
While money laundering is the result of all profit-
motivated criminal activities, the predicate crimes 
associated with money laundering investigations 
are most commonly fraud and drug trafficking 
offences. Of the criminal networks reported to be 
involved in money laundering as their main activity, 
nearly half (49 %) were also involved in drug 
offences, and nearly one third (33 %) in fraud.
Enhanced EU legislation in the field of anti-money 
laundering and the resulting increase of financial 
supervision in the banking sector has made it more 
difficult for criminal networks to introduce illicit 
proceeds into the legal economy through traditional 
banking channels. As a result, money laundering 
attempts are likely to be displaced towards sectors 
with nascent controls or limited oversight. This 
could include the use of underground remittance 
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agencies, alternative banking platforms, international 
trade, and anonymous virtual currencies. The use of 
cryptocurrencies is an area of growing concern, due to 
the absence of a common regulatory regime and the 
level of anonymity these products offer. 
Professional money laundering networks 
continue to pose a major threat(8) . 
Over half of all contributing countries reported the 
existence of specialised criminal networks and individual 
experts offering money laundering as a service on 
a subcontractor basis. Criminal networks appear to 
be increasingly outsourcing their money-laundering 
activities. Reasons for this could include 
8  Levi 2020, Trends in Organized Crime – Making sense of professional enablers’ involvement in laundering organized crime proceeds and 
of their regulation, accessible at https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-020-09401-y
9 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 2018, Professional Money Laundering , accessible at https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/docu-
ments/Professional-Money-Laundering.pdf
the desire to distance themselves from the predicate 
offence or out of necessity for expert help on how to 
launder money without being detected(9). Professional 
money laundering networks have the expertise and 
necessary infrastructure to exploit the legal financial 
industry and offer a wide range of laundering services 
to other criminal networks in exchange for a fee or 
a commission. These include currency conversion 
operations, international transfers bolstered by fictitious 
contracts and invoices, and alternative payment systems, 
as well as services designed to conceal beneficial 
ownership (e.g. locating investments or purchasing 
assets, establishing companies or legal arrangements, 
acting as nominees, or providing account management 
services).  
CRYPTOCURRENCY-LAUNDERING-AS-A-SERVICE: MEMBERS OF A CRIMINAL 
ORGANISATION ARRESTED IN SPAIN 
 
The criminals carried out several money laundering schemes involving the transfer from 
fiat currency to virtual assets in order to hide the illegal origin of proceeds. Some of the 
identified modi operandi used crypto automated teller machines (ATMs) and smurfing, a 
criminal method used to split illicit proceeds into smaller sums before placing these small 
amounts into the financial system to avoid suspicious transaction reporting.
The organisation managed a cryptocurrency exchange business, including two crypto 
ATMs to deposit criminal cash and transform it into cryptocurrency for the benefit of 
other criminal groups. Cash pick-ups carried out by cash-carriers followed by smurfing 
techniques to deposit the criminal cash in several bank accounts controlled by the 
organisation. The funds were moved through several accounts in the process of layering. 
The money was then exchanged into cryptocurrency.
Source: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/cryptocurrency-laundering-
service-members-of-criminal-organisation-arrested-in-spain 
Date: 8 May 2019
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These networks typically maintain business structures, 
including shell companies in offshore jurisdictions and 
exploit legal entities registered in European countries on 
a large scale, especially in jurisdictions in which there 
is a heightened risk of money laundering. Professional 
money launderers also hold bank accounts in several 
countries, and are capable of employing a wide range 
of laundering techniques, ranging from cash couriers, 
money mule networks, underground banking to more 
complex techniques such as bitcoin trading and 
compensation schemes implemented by international 
brokers. Criminal networks who contract the services of 
professional money launderers are often involved in a 
range of crime areas; these are mainly drug trafficking, 
10 Europol 2016, Does crime still pay? Criminal asset recovery in the EU [1 February 2016], accessible at https://www.europol.europa.eu/
publications-documents/does-crime-still-pay 
fraud and tax fraud, but can also include various 
other forms of trafficking and smuggling (e.g. human 
trafficking, firearms trafficking, and the smuggling of 
tobacco and alcohol), as well as THB and terrorism 
financing. Professional money laundering services 
are offered on a transactional basis; however, more 
stable relationships have also been observed as a 
result of longer-term cooperation. Some brokers are 
well-known and sought after, while other relationships 
are based on references. While more traditional forms 
of cooperation still exist, they tend to focus on shared 
infrastructure (companies, enablers, couriers, remitters) 
and occasional cooperation is related to recruitment and 
the maintenance of cash flows. 
FOCUS ON ASSET RECOVERY – A KEY TOOL TO CONFRONT SERIOUS AND ORGANISED 
CRIME 
 
Given that most offences are financially driven, asset recovery is a powerful deterrent in 
the fight against crime. It deprives criminals of their ill-gotten assets and denies them the 
capacity to reinvest them in further crime as well as to integrate them into the mainstream 
economy. However, the effectiveness of the EU in this domain is reportedly low, with more 
than 98 % of the proceeds of crime remaining in the hands of criminals (10). 
Europol perceives a need to considerably strengthen the asset recovery regime in the EU 
and identifies several key points for improvement. 
Asset recovery is a process with five stages: identification, freezing, management, 
confiscation and disposal. From the first to the last stage, the lifecycle of a criminal 
asset relies on the cooperation of different protagonists, which continues to represent a 
challenge in practice. Europol sees a need to better integrate and align the entire asset 
recovery process among law enforcement, judiciary and asset management offices. 
In each Member State, asset recovery offices (ARO) are the specialised units for asset 
forfeiture. They may share their competency with other units at national level, but they 
are usually the main responsible units for international cooperation. From 2016 to 2020, 
according to information received by Europol, the volume of information exchanged among 
EU AROs in the framework of international cooperation doubled, while staffing levels 
increased by 18 % on average. This gap is one indicator of the difficulties for AROs to 
follow up on each case. Adequate prioritisation of asset recovery, also in the framework of 
SOCTA, needs to continue to promote this important law enforcement activity, with a view 
to strengthening the overall EU fight against crime.
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PARALLEL CRIMINAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM
There is a parallel underground financial industry 
providing services to criminals and their networks 
completely detached from the oversight mechanisms 




SYSTEM © EUROPOL 2021
32
HOW SERIOUS AND ORGANISED CRIME IN THE EU
 
Criminal content online 
 
Commerce, communication and the access to 
information are dominated by the internet. The digital  
transformation of our economies, societies and private 
lives is progressing fast and will continue to impact 
all aspects of life. Unsurprisingly, these developments 
have also had a fundamental impact on serious and 
organised crime in the EU. 
 
Virtually all criminal activities now feature 
some	online	components,	such	as	digital	
solutions facilitating criminal communications.
The online domain has transformed retail and 
commerce. Digital marketplaces have made goods more 
accessible. Specialised websites and dedicated apps 
have quickly multiplied and have simplified access to all 
types of commodities and services. 
The transformation of legal commerce has also been 
reflected in the criminal domain. Most illicit activities 
have at least partially moved online. The surface web 
and the dark web are exploited by criminals who offer 
all types of illicit commodities and most illegal services 
online. The availability and accessibility of secure 
online channels has resulted in a diversification of the 
platforms used for illegal online trade. The proliferation 
of encrypted communication channels and social media 
platforms allows criminals to easily advertise their 
illicit offers to a greater number of potential customers. 
Criminals use various countermeasures to ensure their 
operational security online, and rely in so doing on 
services such as virtual private networks (VPNs), proxies 
and anonymous or The Onion Router (TOR) browsers. 
Depending on the commodity or service offered, vendors 
use marketplaces, dedicated shops or internet fora on 
the surface and dark webs. Social media market places, 
closed groups and messaging services are widely used, 
as are encrypted messaging services.
Online retail offers direct access to a broader scope of 
consumers. This development has also entailed a steep 
increase in the use of small parcels, via postal or express 
courier services, to distribute illicit goods. Due to the high 
volume in post shipments, small consignments are less 
likely to be detected. 
11 Europol 2020, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2020, accessible at https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-servic-
es/main-reports/internet-organised-crime-threat-assessment-iocta-2020
Social media mirror advertisements on 
websites and serve as dedicated channels 
for marketing or communication channels for 
criminal networks. All available illicit goods 
and services are also visible on social media. 
Social media and instant messaging services are 
also used to spread disinformation. While spreading 
disinformation in itself often does not amount to 
criminal behaviour, it can encourage or facilitate criminal 
activities. Similar disinformation campaigns have also 
been instigated by fraudsters and counterfeiters in the 
context of the COVID-19 pandemic to generate sales for 
their products or to lure victims into fraud schemes.
Cybercrime services can be purchased by paying a user 
fee, a rental fee or a percentage of the criminal profits. 
Criminal tools such as malware, ransomware, phishing 
facilitators, sniffers, skimmers and distributed denial-
of-service (DDoS) attacks are offered online, especially 
on the dark web. In addition, credit card information 
from the victims of fraud is sold as so-called credit card 
dumps. The crime-as-a-service business model makes 
criminal services easily available to anyone, lowering the 
level of expertise previously required to perform specific 
criminal activities. 
Finally, online platforms provide accessible instructions 
on how to perform most crimes. Manuals and tutorials 
on offer range from the production of synthetic drugs, the 
manufacture of crude firearms and improvised explosive 
devices, to all types of cybercrime activities. 
The dark web also shows high levels of volatility. Law 
enforcement successes in taking down popular market 
places, in combination with cyberattacks on platforms, 
exit fraud or voluntary closures, appear to have generated 
some distrust among users and may have slowed down 
the growth of this online environment (11).
Cryptocurrencies remain an important means 
of payment for criminal services and products. 
Their	decentralisation	and	semi-anonymity	
continue to make them attractive for criminal 
transactions. 
Cryptocurrencies are commonly used by fraudsters. Illicit 
proceeds may be already in the form of virtual currencies 
or digitally converted. New money laundering techniques 
relying on cryptocurrencies involve the use of mixing 
services and coin swappers. 
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Encryption technology is widely used for both licit 
and illicit purposes. Encryption ensures privacy, 
confidentiality, data integrity, and protects personal data 
in communications. End-to-end encryption has become 
a standard security feature for many communication 
channels, including instant messaging applications and 
other online platforms(12). Encryption benefits all users. 
Unfortunately, this includes criminals and their networks. 
Criminals have employed different types of encryption 
to protect their communications from law enforcement 
surveillance online and offline for many years. 
12 Council of the European Union 2020, Council Resolution on Encryption – Security through encryption and security despite encryption [14 
December 2020], accessible at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/12/14/encryption-council-adopts-resolu-
tion-on-security-through-encryption-and-security-despite-encryption/
DEDICATED ENCRYPTED 
COMMUNICATION PLATFORMS FOR 
CRIMINALS 
 
Several providers offer secure 
communication services relying 
on modified mobile devices. Some 
of these services are believed to 
directly and intentionally cater for the 
communication needs of criminals. 
The devices offered by these 
communication services allegedly 
guarantee perfect anonymity and 
have functions, such as camera, 
microphone, GPS, USB ports, 
disabled. These services remove any 
association between the device or 
SIM card and the user. The encrypted 
interface is typically hidden and works 
as part of a dual operating system. 
These phones are sold via networks 
of underground re-sellers instead of 
being distributed via regular retail 
outlets. 
In recent months, several 
investigations into these types 
of communication platforms 
have allowed law enforcement 
authorities in the EU to look into the 
operations of criminal networks. 
Millions of messages exchanged 
between criminals provide a unique, 
unprecedented insight into the criminal 
landscape.
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CRIME SCENES:  
LOCATIONS OF CRIME IN THE EU
International mobility is a defining characteristic of 
criminal networks. Some criminal operations have 
global reach beyond borders. Some locations feature 
characteristics that benefit serious and organised 
crime in the EU and beyond. These locations are 
used to facilitate a single or multiple criminal 
activities, sometimes simultaneously. Key locations 
attract criminals due to their geographic position, 
proximity to or connections with source countries and 
consumer markets. They may offer efficient transport 
infrastructures, business and investment opportunities or 
other advantages to criminals. 
Key	locations	encompass	specific	locations	
such	as	particular	cities,	motorways	or	ferry	
connections as well as more general types of 
infrastructure,	regions,	or	countries.	
Criminal activities in border regions take advantage of 
the natural delineations of individual law enforcement 
jurisdictions which create options to evade law 
enforcement and provide proximity to multiple markets. 
Within the Schengen Area, border travel is unimpeded, 
allowing free movement of persons across borders. 
Geopolitical developments determine the relevance 
of specific regions for the flow of goods and people. 
Humanitarian emergencies, bilateral agreements and 
risk-reward considerations determine the attractiveness 
of a specific border region or section for criminals. 
Urban areas are characterised by a concentration 
of people and often present a multitude of criminal 
opportunities. Burglaries are concentrated in urban 
areas. Pickpockets target victims in crowded places 
such as concerts, markets, on public transport or at 
railway stations. Organised robberies typically take 
place in urban areas and border regions. Victims of 
trafficking in human beings are typically exploited in 
urban areas where there is a larger potential client base. 
Capitals and major cities act as hubs along the main 
migrant smuggling routes. Here, migrants are temporarily 
accommodated in safehouses, receive fraudulent 
documents, plan and initiate secondary movements. 
Remote areas provide more anonymity conducive 
to other criminal activities. Illicit tobacco production 
lines are usually set up in large warehouses in remote 
industrial areas, close to transportation hubs like 
motorways, border crossing points or ports. Remote 
areas in the countryside are ideal locations for the 
dumping of chemical waste from synthetic drug 
production, toxic waste from fuel laundering and 
other waste products. Thefts of construction and 
agricultural machinery are more likely to occur in rural 
areas. Archaeological sites and places of religious 
worship situated in remote areas are targeted for theft 
and looting. Trafficking of human beings for labour 
exploitation often takes place in rural areas home to 
agricultural production. 
Airports are key transit points for goods and people, both 
licit and otherwise. Criminals make frequent use of the 
EU’s main airports as well as smaller regional airports 
operating low-cost airlines. In addition, small airfields 
offer convenient access to the EU and specific regions. 
Trafficking activities by air have been disrupted during 
the COVID-19 pandemic. However, expansion plans for 
many major airports signal a further growth in passenger 
flows after the end of the pandemic.
A dense network of well-maintained motorways 
facilitates the free movement of goods and services 
within the EU. It is also a major crime enabler allowing 
criminals to travel and move goods quickly and 
anonymously. Travel by road is the most accessible 
way of travelling within the EU. Transport means on 
the road include lorries, vans, buses, cars, caravans, or 
taxis. Some vehicles are equipped with sophisticated 
concealment methods to hide drugs and other 
contraband or persons. Motorway infrastructure is used 
for smuggling raw material to production facilities and 
for distributing illicit goods produced in the EU or arriving 
at entry points.
Criminals use European rail infrastructure to transport 
illegal goods such as drugs, stolen vehicles (and their 
parts), illicit tobacco products, as well as irregular 
migrants. Both freight and passenger trains are used. 
Transport by train is of relevance for intra-EU trafficking 
(e.g. of cocaine), for export out of the EU (e.g. stolen 
vehicles) or for import into the EU (e.g. of precursors of 
synthetic drugs). Illicit cigarettes are concealed between 
legal cargo or in hidden compartments, which is then 
typically thrown out of the trains after entering the EU via 
an external border.
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EU	ports	are	key	locations	for	incoming,	
outgoing and transiting shipments of illegal 
goods.	Cocaine,	heroin	and	precursors	for	
synthetic drugs enter the EU through ports in 
large quantities. 
Other illegal goods such as illicit waste, synthetic drugs 
produced in the EU, and stolen vehicles or parts are 
shipped throughout the world departing from EU ports. 
Accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic, the shipping of 
orders placed online fulfilled by post and parcel services 
continues to expand in volume every year. Postal and 
parcel services are abused for the distribution of illicit 
goods such as drugs (cannabis, cocaine, synthetic drugs 
including new psychoactive substances), counterfeit 
currency, stolen and fraudulent documents and many 
other illegal commodities. 
Clandestine locations such as private or rented 
apartments are used as pop-up brothels where victims 
are sexually exploited, including children. Apartments 
serve as safe houses used to conceal irregular migrants 
in between different legs of their journeys.
Reception centres for asylum applicants are targeted 
by human traffickers and migrant smugglers to recruit 
irregular migrants and potential trafficking victims. Upon 
their entry into the EU, facilitated irregular migrants and 
victims of THB are often accommodated in reception 
centres where they apply for international protection. 
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citizens, businesses and 
critical infrastructure
Cyber-dependent crime is any criminal activity that can 
only be committed using computers, computer networks 
or other forms of information communication technology 
(ICT). Such crimes are typically directed at computers, 
networks or other ICT resources. It includes the creation 
and spread of malware, hacking to steal sensitive 
personal or industry data, denial of service attacks to 




terms of the number of attacks reported but 
also in terms of the sophistication of attacks. 
Cyber-dependent	crime	is	likely	significantly	
underreported. 
Cyber-dependent crime causes significant financial loss 
to businesses, private citizens and the public sector 
each year through payments for ransomware, incident 
recovery costs and costs for enhanced cyber-security 
measures. Attacks to critical infrastructure have a 
significant impact and can potentially entail severe 
consequences, including loss of life.
The rapidly progressing digitalisation of society and 
the economy constantly creates new opportunities for 
criminals involved in cyber-dependent crime. The steady 
increase in the number of users and connections creates 
new vulnerabilities and opens more potential victims to 
cyberattacks. During 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has 
seen a surge in connections from private to corporate 
systems as telework became the norm in many sectors 
and industries. This development has made many 
corporate networks more vulnerable to cyberattacks.
The availability of cybercrime services online as part of 
a crime-as-a-service business model makes cybercrime 
more accessible by lowering the technological expertise 
required to carry out these crimes.
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WORLD’S MOST DANGEROUS MALWARE EMOTET DISRUPTED 
 
EMOTET has been one of the most professional and long lasting cybercrime services out 
there. First discovered as a banking Trojan in 2014, the malware evolved into the go-to 
solution for cybercriminals over the years. The EMOTET infrastructure essentially acted 
as a primary door opener for computer systems on a global scale. Once this unauthorised 
access was established, these were sold to other top-level criminal groups to deploy 
further illicit activities such data theft and extortion through ransomware.
The EMOTET group managed to take email as an attack vector to a next level. Through a 
fully automated process, EMOTET malware was delivered to the victims’ computers via 
infected e-mail attachments. A variety of different lures were used to trick unsuspecting 
users into opening these malicious attachments. In the past, EMOTET email campaigns 
have also been presented as invoices, shipping notices and information about COVID-19. 
EMOTET was much more than just a malware. What made EMOTET so dangerous is that 
the malware was offered for hire to other cybercriminals to install other types of malware, 
such as banking Trojans or ransomwares, onto a victim’s computer. 
This type of attack is called a ‘loader’ operation, and EMOTET is said to be one of the 
biggest players in the cybercrime world as other malware operators like TrickBot and Ryuk 
have benefited from it. 
Its unique way of infecting networks by spreading the threat laterally after gaining access 
to just a few devices in the network made it one of the most resilient forms of malware in 
the wild. 
The infrastructure that was used by EMOTET involved several hundreds of servers located 
across the world, all of these having different functionalities in order to manage the 
computers of the infected victims, to spread to new ones, to serve other criminal groups, 
and to ultimately make the network more resilient against takedown attempts.
Source: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/world%E2%80%99s-most-
dangerous-malware-emotet-disrupted-through-global-action 
Date: 27 January 2021
Criminal services and tools such as malware, 
ransomware, DDoS and instructions to perform many 
types of attacks are offered online, often on the dark 
web. Cybercrime services and tools can be purchased 
by paying a user fee, a rental fee or even a percentage 
of the criminal profits. The affiliate model (also known 
as ransomware-as-a-service) allows ransomware 
developers and the cybercriminals that deploy the 
solutions to share the criminal profits. Developers offer 
technical expertise and support as service providers to 
affiliates who are often entry-level cybercriminals that 
identify and infect vulnerable targets. 
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Businesses are increasingly the targets of 
cyberattacks.	Public	institutions,	including	
critical	infrastructures	such	as	health	services,	
continue to be targeted by cybercriminals. A 
potential leak of data or service disruptions in 
these	sectors	could	result	in	very	high	financial	
and social costs. 
The threat from cyber-dependent crimes is set to further 
increase in volume and sophistication over the coming 
years. Cybercrime is highly dynamic, exploiting rapidly 
advancing technologies. Critical infrastructures will 
continue to be targeted by cybercriminals in the coming 
years, which poses significant risks. Developments such 
as the expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT), the 
increased use of artificial intelligence (AI), applications 
for biometrics data or the availability of autonomous 
vehicles will have a significant impact. These innovations 
will create criminal opportunities. The performance of AI 
systems and applications relies on data sets. Malicious 
access to these data entails the disclosure of personal 
information. If AI is used in decision-making systems, the 
13 TrendMicro, UNICRI and Europol 2020, Malicious uses and abuses of artificial intelligence, accessible at https://www.europol.europa.eu/
publications-documents/malicious-uses-and-abuses-of-artificial-intelligence
manipulation of data may have serious consequences 
for individual users. The criminal use of AI, including the 
exploitation of deepfakes, is expected to increase in the 
future. The incorporation of AI into existing techniques 
may widen the scope and scale of cyberattacks(13). 
The use of cryptocurrencies and the proliferation of 
anonymisation techniques, including encryption, will 
continue to grow. 
Cyber-dependent crime comprises a number of 
different attack techniques and modi operandi, which 
are constantly evolving in order to exploit previously 
unknown vulnerabilities.
MALWARE
Malware is a common type of cyberattack that uses 
malicious code to infiltrate and take over a computer, 
network or mobile device. Malware attacks aim to steal 
data and carry out identity theft, cause service  
disruptions and support espionage. 
The DDoS attack overloads the 
servers of essential internet 
services and makes them 
inaccessible for regular users
The DDoS service launches the 






DDoS services claim to 
be legal but they are not 




The criminal hires a 
DDoS attack service 
on the internet
CRIMINAL
HOW CAN DDOS ATTACKS PARALYSE THE INTERNET © EUROPOL 2021
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Cybercriminals deploying malware attacks are primarily 
driven by a profit motive and, to a lesser degree, attempts 
to build up their reputation in the hacking community.
Malware is a widely used cybercrime tool. Malware 
constantly evolves and is highly diverse, existing 
in hundreds of thousands of variants. The EU’s 
cybersecurity agency ENISA reports the detection of  
230 000 new strains of malware every day(14). 
RANSOMWARE
Ransomware has been acknowledged as a key 
cybercrime threat for some years now. However, the 
number of attacks and the level of their sophistication 
continues to increase. The increase in the number of 
attacks on public institutions and large companies is 
particularly notable.
DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE 
DDoS attacks are a well-known and persistent threat 
that are designed to disrupt or shut down a service/
network by overwhelming it. Cybercriminals orchestrate 
persistent attacks which might be followed by ransom 
requests offering to cease the attack in exchange for a 
payment. Cybercriminals now increasingly target smaller 
organisations with lower security standards(15). However, 
they continue to attack public institutions and critical 
infrastructures as well.
CRIMINAL OFFENDERS
Cybercrime is attractive to criminals due to the potential 
profits, limited risk of detection and prosecution, which if 
successful often only results in low sentences. Various 
types of criminals are involved in cyber-dependent 
crimes, ranging from structured criminal groups to lone 
offenders. Potential offenders without any specific  
expertise can also carry out cybercrime attacks by relying 
on tools and services available to them through crime-as-
a-service. 
14 ENISA 2020, Main incidents in the EU and worldwide, accessible at https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-
2020-main-incidents
15 Europol 2020, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2020 [5 October 2020], accessible at https://www.europol.europa.
eu/activities-services/main-reports/internet-organised-crime-threat-assessment-iocta-2020
16 Eurojust and Europol 2019, Common challenges in combating cybercrime, accessible at https://www.europol.europa.eu/publica-
tions-documents/common-challenges-in-combating-cybercrime
17 Europol 2020, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2020 [5 October 2020], accessible at https://www.europol.europa.
eu/activities-services/main-reports/internet-organised-crime-threat-assessment-iocta-2020
Online child sexual 
exploitation
Online child sexual exploitation includes all acts of a 
sexually exploitative nature carried out against a child 
that have, at some stage, a connection to the online 
environment.
Child sexual abuse is traumatic and often entails 
long-lasting and severe damage to the physical and 
psychological wellbeing of the victims, which can lead to 
self-harm, including suicide. This type of abuse typically 
also involves harassment, systematic abuse and verbal, 
psychological and physical violence against children. 
There has been a continuous increase in 
activities related to online child sexual abuse 
over recent years. Child sexual exploitation 
targets the most vulnerable members of 
society.  
Online child abuse material can easily be accessed 
on all types of devices, including mobile devices. 
The widespread abuse of encryption tools, including 
end-to-end encrypted apps, has lowered the risk of 
detection by offenders(16). Offenders increasingly rely on 
anonymisation services such as virtual private networks 
(VPNs) or proxy servers. The number of reported 
incidents involving live distance child abuse has steadily 
increased in recent years. This development has further 
intensified during the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result 
of the lockdown measures imposed to halt the spread 
of the COVID-19 pandemic, children have been spending 
more time online unsupervised, making them more 
vulnerable to exploitation. While most of the cases of 
live distance child abuse take place in Southeast Asian 
countries, especially in the Philippines, cases of live 
distance child abuse in the EU have also recently been 
detected(17).
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Child sexual abuse material is typically 
produced in the victim’s domestic environment 
and most often by those in the child’s circle of 
trust(18). 
Online offenders use fake identities and grooming 
techniques to gain the victim’s trust and obtain illicit 
content by manipulating or blackmailing them. Victims 
are often recorded while performing sexual acts 
without being aware they are being filmed. Offenders 
use the word ‘capping’ (which comes from the phrase 
to capture material of victims) when talking about this 
kind of material. Child sexual abuse material is usually 
password-protected and stored locally or through online 
storage services. These hosting services are often 
unaware of the material hosted on their servers. Mobile 
devices are increasingly used to store and distribute child 
sexual abuse material.
Children now often have unsupervised access to the 
internet. This exposes children to the potential abuse 
by criminals as they often do not have the maturity 
to assess a relationship as friendly or abusive. The 
normalisation of sexual behaviours online also lowers 
the threshold for sharing self-generated content 
consensually or through coercion. The amount of self-
generated material produced as a result of manipulation 
or ransom has increased. 
Live distance child abuse refers to the phenomenon 
of a perpetrator paying to direct the live abuse 
of children through video-sharing platforms. The 
abuse is sometimes captured or recorded for further 
dissemination online, which results in the repeated 
re-victimisation of the child, as with other types of child 
abuse material. The vast majority of live-streamed abuse 
depicts girls below the age of 13 in a home setting(19). 
Live streaming is a key threat and the number 
of incidents involving this type of abuse has 
been continuously increasing for several years 
now. 
A large number of offenders access and exchange child 
abuse material online. A smaller number of offenders 
are involved in the production of materials and in 
the management of the technical platforms used to 
18 Australian Institute of Family Studies 2015, Conceptualising the prevention of child sexual abuse, accessible at https://acuresearchbank.
acu.edu.au/download/5bb2f7760724b150faee97eef3bf9afcfd4cb50e87d7fbab4096c71055c5c82c/1704205/OA_Quadara_2015_Conceptu-
alising_the_prevention_of_child_sexual.pdf
19 Internet Watch Foundation 2018, Trends in Online Child Sexual Exploitation: Examining the Distribution of Captures of Live-streamed 
Child Sexual Abuse, accessible at https://bit.ly/2rIT0LP
20 Europol 2020, Exploiting isolation – Offenders and victims of online child sexual abuse during the COVID 19 pandemic, accessible at 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/exploiting-isolation-offenders-and-victims-of-online-child-sexual-abuse-during-cov-
id-19-pandemic
exchange abuse materials. Many of these key facilitators 
are believed to operate on the dark web to exchange 
expertise on how to maintain operational security and 
new technical capabilities. They use fora as meeting 
places where participation is structured similarly to 
criminal organisations, with affiliation rules, codes of 
conduct, division of tasks and strict hierarchies(20).
STOP CHILD ABUSE – TRACE AN 
OBJECT 
 
Europol is currently in possession 
of more than 40 million images of 
child sexual abuse from around the 
world. In June 2017, it launched a 
crowdsourcing campaign called 
Stop Child Abuse—Trace An Object. 
Censored extracts from explicit 
images are regularly published on their 
website and members of the public are 
asked to help in tracing their location 
or country of origin.
These tips are then used to inform a 
competent law enforcement authority 
to further investigate the lead and 
to assist in the identification of the 
offender and the victim.
You can help as well! Follow the link to 
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Non-cash payment fraud and 
other cyber-scams
Non-cash payment fraud encompasses all kinds of 
fraudulent activities related to classical payment 
methods, including both card-present and card-not-
present payments. Cyber-scams are a diverse range 
of fraud schemes that are exclusively or primarily 
perpetrated online. These may include, but are not limited 
to:
 • Business email compromise (BEC) fraud, which 
targets businesses and organisations and continues 
to increase in the number of attempts and their 
sophistication;
 • New modi operandi such as SIM Swapping and 
SMishing, which pose a significant risk to the victims’ 
identities and finances(21) ;
 • Online investment fraud, which targets thousands 
of EU citizens every year and increasingly relies on 
selling novel investments, such as cryptocurrencies;
21 Europol 2020, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2020 , accessible at https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-ser-
vices/main-reports/internet-organised-crime-threat-assessment-iocta-2020 
 • Phishing, which remains a significant threat and is 
further evolving in sophistication. 
Non-cash payment fraud and cyber-scams are well 
established criminal activities that have been targeting 
the EU for decades now. The ongoing digitalisation of 
almost all aspects of life creates additional opportunities 
for cybercriminals.
The move toward cashless economies creates 
powerful incentives for payment fraudsters. 




The increasing use of mobile devices for financial 
transactions and authentication processes has made 
them a target for cybercriminals.
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TEN HACKERS ARRESTED FOR STRING OF SIM-SWAPPING ATTACKS AGAINST 
CELEBRITIES 
 
The attacks orchestrated by this criminal gang targeted thousands of victims throughout 
2020, including famous internet influencers, sport stars, musicians and their families. The 
criminals are believed to have stolen from them over USD 100 million in cryptocurrencies 
after illegally gaining access to their phones.
Initiated in the spring of 2020, the investigation uncovered how a network composed of a 
dozen criminals worked together to access the victims’ phone numbers and take control of 
their apps or accounts by changing the passwords. 
This enabled them to steal money, cryptocurrencies and personal information, including 
contacts synced with online accounts. They also hijacked social media accounts to post 
content and send messages masquerading as the victim. 
This type of fraud is known as ‘sim swapping’ and it was identified as a key trend on 
the rise in the latest Europol Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment. It involves 
cybercriminals taking over use of a victim’s phone number by essentially deactivating their 
SIM and porting the allocated number over to a SIM belonging to a member of the criminal 
network.
This is typically achieved by the criminals exploiting phone service providers to do the 
swap on their behalf, either via a corrupt insider or using social engineering techniques.
Source: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/ten-hackers-arrested-for-string-
of-sim-swapping-attacks-against-celebrities 
Date: 10 February 2021
45
EU SERIOUS AND ORGANISED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT 2021
THE TRADE IN ILLEGAL  
DRUGS IN THE EU 
EU drug markets are supplied by sophisticated criminal 
networks using a variety of modi operandi engaging in 
wholesale trafficking activities as well as mid-level and 
retail distribution. The trade in each of the four main 
commodity groups of illegal drugs dominating European 
drug markets has unique features. However, a number of 
elements are common to trafficking activities involving 
drugs.
The use of violence related to the trade in 
drugs has escalated notably in recent years. 





In some Member States, competition between drug 
suppliers has intensified, resulting in an increase in the 
number of violent clashes. 
The nature of violent incidents appears to be changing as 
well. A growing number of criminals use violence more 
offensively. The availability of firearms and explosives is 
a key enabler for serious violence.  
 
Corruption enables drug trafficking. Criminal networks 
involved in drug trafficking frequently use corruption. 
However, Member States continue to appear to be either 
reluctant to report corruption or to suffer from significant 
intelligence gaps. 
Corruption is common in countries of origin and in transit 
countries for drugs destined for the EU. 
Within	the	EU,	recent	large	investigations	
supported by Europol have shown that the role 
of corruption has been largely underestimated. 
Corruption is used to undermine transport infrastructure, 
pass border crossing points or gain access to ports and 
airports. Criminal networks have infiltrated transport 
infrastructure across the EU. 
Technology is widely used to facilitate the production, 
trafficking and distribution of drugs. The production and 
trafficking of drugs is subject to continuous innovation. 
Encrypted applications, services and devices appear to 
have emerged as the primary means of communication 
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among criminals involved in the drugs trade. Encrypted 
software based on Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) and 
commercial encryption applications are commonly used. 
It is now quite uncommon for criminal networks to use 
unencrypted means of communication. 
The online trade in drugs has continued to grow over 
recent years and has the potential to expand further. 
However, the supply of drugs via online platforms 
remains limited compared to traditional offline supply. 
The online trade in drugs typically takes place at retail 
level, involving frequent but small individual shipments(22). 
Criminal networks engaged in wholesale trafficking of 
drugs continue to rely on offline logistics. 
The use of dark web platforms to distribute drugs has 
increased, despite some significant law enforcement 
successes such as the takedown of some of the 
busiest platforms. These successes, in combination 
with cyberattacks on platforms, exit fraud or voluntary 
closures, appear to have generated some distrust among 
users and may have slowed the growth rate.
Illicit drugs cause serious and direct harm to consumers’ 
health. Drug markets fuel a vast underground economy. 
22 EMCDDA and Europol 2019, EU Drug Markets Report 2019, accessible at https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/joint-publications/
eu-drug-markets-report-2019_en
Underground economies cause economic dependency, 
undermine local communities and perpetuate the 
presence of criminal structures. The presence of criminal 
networks in local communities undermines social values, 
weakens the rule of law and contributes to a culture of 
impunity. 
The production of drugs has a significant impact on the 
environment in the EU. Synthetic drug manufacturing 
produces significant amounts of hazardous waste. 
Dumping sites have increased as a result of adding 
additional steps for the conversion of (pre-)precursors 
into precursors and dump sites require a long and 
expensive cleaning process. Outdoor cannabis 
cultivation significantly damages fauna and flora. 
Cannabis
The cannabis market remains by far the largest drug 
market in the EU, with a majority of Member States 
reporting that the trade in cannabis is either increasing 
or stable. Cannabis resin and herbal cannabis remain 
CANNABIS TRAFFICKING ROUTES TO AND WITHIN THE EU
EU DRUGS MARKET REPORT 2019 (EMCDDA AND EUROPOL); EU SOCTA 2021 DATA COLLECTION
RESIN HERB
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the two main cannabis products traded in the EU. The 
average potency of both cannabis resin and herbal 
cannabis has increased over the last decade. A higher 
strength/potency of cannabis increases its potential 
harm. 
The cannabis market is expected to remain the largest 
drug market in the EU. Cannabis trafficking will remain a 
significant source of income for a wide range of criminal 
networks. Herbal cannabis production is expected to 
continue to take place in and close to the profitable EU 
consumer markets. 
EU-based cannabis cultivation will remain innovative in 
terms of growth, lighting and monitoring methods that 
increasingly apply laboratory technology to extract and 
test cannabis(23). Criminal networks are expected to 
invest in these developments and a further diversification 
of cannabis products can be expected. 
23 Cannabis Tech 2019, How Smartphone Apps are Helping the Cannabis Industry Evolve, accessible at  https://www.cannabistech.com/
articles/how-smartphone-apps-are-helping-the-cannabis-industry-evolve/ 
24 EMCDDA and Europol 2019, EU Drug Markets Report 2019, accessible at https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/joint-publications/
eu-drug-markets-report-2019_en
The distribution of cannabis using post and parcel 
services is set to further increase and is directly linked to 
the expanding online trade in drugs. 
The establishment of legal cannabis markets in some 
countries outside the EU has led to the diversion of 
cannabis from legal supply chains and the emergence 
of new cannabis products that are difficult to detect on 
entry to the EU(24). 
The indoor cultivation of cannabis in the EU remains the 
main source of herbal cannabis distributed within the EU. 
The EU-based production of herbal cannabis continued 
to expand over recent years. 
Cannabis cultivation is believed to take place in 
all	Member	States,	albeit	with	different	levels	
of sophistication and scale. 
 
ELECTRICITY BILL OF OVER EUR 1.5 MILLION LEADS POLICE TO 5 ILLEGAL HERBAL 
CANNABIS PLANTATIONS IN SPAIN 
 
The organised crime network, comprised essentially of Albanian nationals, would locate 
and equip buildings in quiet areas in the suburbs of Barcelona, Spain, for the large-scale 
production of herbal cannabis (3-4 harvests per year).
The criminals were diverting the electric and water supply to illegally cultivate the plants 
indoors. Once harvested, the herbal cannabis was sent to the Netherlands hidden in pallets 
loaded onto lorries. These criminals widely used encrypted means of communication.
Source: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/electricity-bill-of-over-
%E2%82%AC15-million-leads-police-to-5-illegal-marijuana-plantations-in-spain 
Date: 26 November 2020
Albania remains a major source of herbal cannabis 
trafficked into the EU. Morocco remains the main source 
for cannabis resin trafficked to the EU. Some cannabis 
resin also originates from Afghanistan, Lebanon and 
Syria.  
 
Criminal networks engaged in cannabis trafficking 
are highly organised. They are typically hierarchically 
structured with roles and levels well-defined around 
the leadership, or relatively tightly organised but 
unstructured, and surrounded by a network of individuals 
engaged in criminal activities. A large share of the cases 
reported to Europol featuring fatal and serious violence 
are related to drugs, in particular the trade in cannabis. 
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Cocaine
A number of indicators point to a significant increase 
in cocaine trafficking activities into the EU over recent 
years, including estimations that the global manufacture 
of cocaine is at an all-time high(25). These indicators also 
show that EU cocaine seizures are at record heights(26)  
and that an increasing number of investigations and 
suspects are being reported to Europol. The purity of 
cocaine at retail is at the highest level ever recorded 
in the EU(27). The majority of Member States report an 
increase in cocaine trafficking since 2016. The cocaine 
market has attracted a growing number of EU-based and 
non-EU criminal networks. More criminal networks have 
been reported as being involved in cocaine trafficking 
than for any other criminal activity. Along with the North 
American market, it is believed that the European market 
for cocaine is among the largest in the world.
25 UNODC 2020, World Drug Report 2020, accessible at https://wdr.unodc.org/wdr2020/
26 EMCDDA 2020, European Drug Report, Trends and Developments 2020, accessible at https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/edr/
trends-developments/2020_en
27 EMCDDA and Europol 2019, EU Drug Markets Report 2019, accessible at https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/joint-publications/
eu-drug-markets-report-2019_en
28 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2021, The cocaine pipeline to Europe, accessible at https://globalinitiative.net/
analysis/cocaine-to-europe/
Europe has emerged a premier destination for 
cocaine	traffickers.
This development has been attributed to the potential 
for further growth in the consumption of cocaine, higher 
prices for cocaine compared to the North American 
market as well as lower risks of interdiction and 
seizure(28).
Latin American criminal networks are expected to 
continue collaborating with international EU-based 
criminal networks, while EU criminal networks are 
expected to continue to be attracted by more favourable 
prices in countries that produce and transit cocaine and 
at the main EU distribution hubs. In the EU, high cocaine 
availability, low wholesale prices and a high level of purity 
are expected to remain features of the cocaine market in 
the short term. 
COCAINE TRAFFICKING ROUTES TO THE EU







KEY PORTS OF 
DEPARTURE 
AIR ROUTE LAND ROUTE
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Cocaine smuggled to the EU mainly originates from 
Colombia(29), followed by Peru and Bolivia. The current 
record levels of cocaine production have resulted in an 
29 EMCDDA and Europol 2019, EU Drug Markets Report 2019, accessible at https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/joint-publications/
eu-drug-markets-report-2019_en; UNODC 2019, World Drug Report 2019, accessible at https://wdr.unodc.org/wdr2019/
intensification and diversification of cocaine trafficking 
activities targeting the EU. 
COCAINE CARTEL SHIPPING FROM SOUTH AMERICA BUSTED IN SPAIN AND THE 
NETHERLANDS 
 
Law enforcement officers raided locations in the Dutch cities of Amsterdam, Papendrecht, 
Rotterdam, Utrecht and the Spanish cities of Valencia and Malaga. They arrested eight 
suspects (five in Spain and three in the Netherlands), one of them believed to be a leader of 
the network. During the operations, the officers from the Spanish police seized six tonnes 
of cocaine, jewellery, cash and encrypted devices. The suspects are believed to have used 
self-developed encrypted mobile applications to communicate with their counterparts. 
Individuals with military training and experience in war missions supported the logistical 
set-up of the criminal network.  
Source: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/cocaine-cartel-shipping-south-
america-busted-in-spain-and-netherlands 
Date: 16 October 2020
Most of the cocaine seized in the EU is transported by 
ship, primarily in maritime shipping containers. Cocaine 
is trafficked to the EU directly from the producing 
countries as well as from neighbouring countries of 




by road transport in passenger vehicles and 
lorries to local markets.  
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Intra-EU trafficking of cocaine may also involve 
commercial flights, light aircraft and helicopters, railway, 
sea transport, and post and parcel services. Cocaine 
loads are often hidden in sophisticated concealed 
compartments in cars, trucks and other vehicles. These 
are also used to transport cash back to the distribution 
hubs.
Cocaine trafficking is a key criminal activity for criminal 
networks. A large variety of individuals, groups and 
networks shape the complex supply of cocaine to the 
EU. Criminal networks engaged in cocaine trafficking 
are highly organised. They are typically hierarchically 
structured with roles and levels well defined around their 
leadership. Some large criminal networks are organised 
in several cells or branches operating in different 
territories or carrying out specific criminal activities. 
The booming cocaine market has entailed an increase 
in the number of killings, shootings, bombings, arsons, 
kidnappings, torture and intimidation related to the trade 
in cocaine. The nature of the violence appears to have 
changed: a growing number of criminal networks use 
violence in a more offensive way. 
30 EMCDDA 2020, European Drug Report, Trends and Developments 2020, accessible at https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/edr/
trends-developments/2020_en
Heroin
The market for heroin has largely remained stable over 
the last four years. The price of heroin is also reported 
to have remained stable or decreased over the last 
four years. Over the last ten years, seizures in the EU 
have largely remained stable year-on-year. In 2018, the 
quantity of heroin seized in the EU increased to 9.7 
tonnes, up from 5.2 tonnes in 2017, mainly due to large 
individual seizures made in the port of Antwerp(30).
The processing and production of heroin takes place in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. In recent years, some 
laboratories processing morphine into heroin were 
discovered in the EU. This is an emerging phenomenon 
that should be monitored closely considering the 
increasing number of discovered multi-purpose 
laboratories in the EU that are used flexibly for the 
production of synthetic drugs, (pre-)precursor conversion 
and cocaine extraction. In some Member States, 
synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl and its analogues, 
may be partially replacing heroin as the preferred 
substance due to its greater potency and cheaper price.
HEROIN TRAFFICKING ROUTES TO AND WITHIN THE EU
Afghanistan
Pakistan
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There has been little change in the way heroin is 
trafficked to the EU. The wholesale trafficking of 
heroin to the EU is believed to follow a number of 
established routes, including the Balkan routes from 
Turkey traversing the Balkan region as well as the South 
Caucasus route via Iran, Turkey, Georgia and Ukraine. 
The Balkan routes remain the main entry 
routes	for	heroin	trafficked	to	the	EU.	For	the	
most	part,	heroin	is	trafficked	along	these	
routes in lorries hidden among legal freight and 
cover loads or in concealed compartments.
Acetic anhydride is the main precursor substance used in 
the production of heroin. It is widely used in the legal 
chemical industry in the EU. In line with the increased 
production output in the region of production, the illegal 
trade in acetic anhydride has also increased.
The trafficking and trade in heroin in the EU involves 
criminal networks composed of nationals of various 
Member States as well as non-EU citizens. Differentiating 
the involved criminal networks in the heroin trade by 
nationality is difficult. The region of origin for heroin 
trafficked to the EU features many ethnic communities 
based in different countries and across borders. For 
instance, suspects involved in the trafficking of heroin to 
the EU often have a Kurdish ethnic background, but may 
variably hold Turkish, Iraqi or Iranian nationality as well 
as EU citizenship. 
LARGE-SCALE HEROIN SHIPMENTS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST: 2.4 TONNES OF HEROIN 
SEIZED AND TWO HIGH-VALUE CRIMINAL TARGETS ARRESTED 
 
During the investigations and action day, more than 2.4 tonnes of heroin were seized. The 
majority of the heroin consignments were heading to the Netherlands and destined for the 
European illegal heroin market. The Turkish criminal network and their criminal logistic 
infrastructure and facilitators were dismantled. In total, 13 criminals were arrested in the 
Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and Belgium, including two high-value criminal targets. The 
heroin was hidden in food, in construction materials, compartments for goods in trucks 




Date: 16 March 2020
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Synthetic drugs and new 
psychoactive substances
The production, trafficking and distribution of synthetic 
drugs has been previously reported as a highly dynamic 
crime area subject to rapid change and innovation 
in terms of the substances, production methods and 
suspects involved. This remains true and has been 
reflected in the increasing sophistication of business 
models, the innovation in the use of different (pre-)
precursor substances, essential chemicals and synthesis 
routes in response to the scheduling of specific 
substances and other regulatory approaches to curbing 
synthetic drug production. 
The trade in synthetic drugs in the EU is 
unique compared to other substances as the 
production of these drugs in most cases takes 
place in the EU and they are subsequently 
distributed on a global level and on European 
markets. 
The large-scale production of synthetic drugs, especially 
those originating from the Netherlands and Belgium, is 
likely intended for distribution outside the EU and to meet 
demand on European markets.
The production of synthetic drugs in the EU is expanding 
and is expected to continue to do so in the near future. 
There is a risk that non-EU criminal networks with 
access to expertise and (pre-)precursor substances will 
increasingly get involved in synthetic drug production 
in the EU, potentially collaborating with established 
criminals, further contributing to an expansion of 
production capacities in the EU. The laboratories used for 
the production of synthetic drugs discovered in the EU 
are becoming more professional and versatile, delivering 
increasing production output and providing greater 
flexibility in terms of which substances are produced and 
how they are produced.
The EU is a major source for amphetamine-type 
stimulants distributed to consumers in the EU and 
all over the world. Major producers and suppliers of 
EU DRUGS MARKET REPORT 2019 (EMCDDA AND EUROPOL); EU SOCTA 2021 DATA COLLECTION
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amphetamine and MDMA appear to be located in the 
Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, Belgium. In addition 
to these countries, (partial) amphetamine production 
also takes place in Poland, Bulgaria, Germany and 
Sweden. 
Large-scale methamphetamine production in the 
Netherlands and Belgium has emerged over the last 
four years and may further increase in the future due to 
the strong profit incentives. An increasing number of 
laboratories have been discovered over recent years in 
both the Netherlands and Belgium. 
While the availability of new psychoactive substances 
(NPS) in the EU remains a concern, the frequency with 
which they appear on European markets has slowed in 
recent years. 
Dutch criminal networks are the leading producers of 
synthetic drugs such as amphetamine, methamphetamine 
and methylenedioxymethamphetamine (known as 
MDMA) in the EU. They cooperate with criminal 
distributors across the EU and worldwide. Dutch criminal 
networks are believed to exercise control over the 
production of these synthetic drugs in the Netherlands 
as well as in Belgium, where they control Belgian 
subsidiaries engaged in drug manufacturing.
Criminal networks and criminals active in the production 
of synthetic drugs display a particularly high degree 
of specialisation and task division. For instance, 
some criminal networks from Poland specialise in the 
acquisition and transportation of (pre-)precursor or 
essential chemicals to centres of production in the 
Netherlands and Belgium for all types of synthetic 
drugs, and to Czechia, primarily for the production 
of methamphetamine. Similarly, Bulgarian criminal 
networks engage less in production and appear to be 
more active in the procurement and provision of (pre-)
precursors and other essential chemicals on behalf 
of producers. In many cases, the criminal networks 
responsible for the large-scale production of synthetic 
drugs hand the finished product over to a criminal 
network specialised in the logistics of transporting drug 
consignments to destination markets across the world.
Synthetic drug production in the EU generates significant 
amounts of chemical waste, which is frequently dumped 
by producers in public places and has a highly negative 
impact on the environment. Centres of production of 
synthetic drugs in the EU such as the Netherlands, 
Belgium and, to a lesser degree, Czechia and Slovakia 
are particularly affected by this toxic waste dumping. 
Producers of synthetic drugs make use of open borders 
and minimal checks by dumping waste in neighbouring 
countries close to drug production sites. 
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ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME
Waste and pollution crime
Illicit waste trafficking entails the ‘illegal transportation, 
processing, disposal, recycling or recovery of various 
waste materials’. Trafficked waste materials include both 
non-hazardous and hazardous waste, including chemical 
waste, construction waste, urban solid waste, industrial 
waste, oils and oil blending, plastic waste, waste of 
electronic and electric equipment (WEEE), end-of-life 
vehicles and car parts (especially tyres and batteries), 
scrap metals, liquid manure, and black mass (powder 
derived from alkaline batteries). End-of-life maritime 
vessels are trafficked from the EU to Asia for demolition. 
Waste management is a lucrative and fast-developing 
industry, which increasingly attracts criminals. 
The	majority	of	the	reported	waste	trafficking	
cases involved individuals working in or 
operating waste management companies as 
managers	or	staff,	who	violate	national	
and international legislation and standards 
regulating	the	collection,	treatment	and	
disposal	of	waste	to	maximise	profits.	
The most successful waste traffickers are those who 
control the entire processing cycle, from source to 
destination countries. Criminals trafficking waste 
between different countries primarily use legal business 
structures to orchestrate waste crimes. Often multiple 
companies are owned by the same individuals or by 
strawpersons. The legal business structures frequently 
change leadership and are often terminated after a short 
period of activity, as a new trading entity takes over the 
business. Companies operating different stages in the 
waste cycle are often located in different jurisdictions. 
Waste trafficking is strongly linked to other offences 
such as document fraud, economic fraud, tax evasion, 
corruption, money laundering, as well as theft and the 
dumping of waste from illegal drug production. 
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COVID-19 WASTE CRIME: EUROPE-WIDE OPERATION TO TACKLE UNLAWFUL 
SANITARY WASTE DISPOSAL 
Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, Europol has identified the potential growth 
of unlawful sanitary waste treatment and disposal, and has as a result launched operation 
Retrovirus. Officers carried out inspections and checks on sanitary waste plants and 
transportation, which were crucial in halting the illegal trafficking, storage, dumping and 
shipment of waste and document fraud. 
 
Another trend identified during the operation was the possible pollution of urban residual 
waters. The Spanish Civil Guard launched operation Arcovid to investigate the filtering 




Date: 30 November 2020
31 CITES 2020, Wildlife crime, accessible at https://cites.org/eng/prog/iccwc/crime.php
Wildlife crime
Wildlife crime refers to poaching, collecting, trading 
(supplying, selling or trafficking), importing, exporting, 
processing, possessing, obtaining and consumption of 
wild fauna and flora, including timber and other forest 
products, in contravention of national or international 
law(31). 
Wildlife crime increases the risks of extinction of 
endangered fauna and flora and of further degradation 
of biodiversity. Wildlife trafficking also presents risks to 
human health via the possible transmission of diseases.  
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Traffickers increasingly target endemic and non-CITES(32) 
-listed European species, in particular birds and big 
cats. There has also been an increase in demand for 
exotic reptiles. Traffickers may further concentrate their 
activities on endemic and non-CITES-listed specimens to 
circumvent current international legislative frameworks, 
which mostly cover endangered wildlife.
The majority of trafficked animals are sold and bought 
online. Sellers and buyers use online marketplaces, 
social media, mobile applications and specialised fora 
where networks of regular sellers and buyers discuss 
available merchandise, offers and prices or share 
32 CITES is a multilateral treaty to protect endangered plants and animals.
knowledge and expertise on hunting and breeding 
techniques. Common encrypted communication tools 
such as mobile applications and online chats are widely 
used by traffickers, sellers and buyers.
Criminal groups composed of EU and non-EU nationals 
are involved in wildlife trafficking across several 
continents. The nationality of suspects largely depends 
on their role. Poachers and collectors almost always 
come from the country of origin of the trafficked 
specimens, while mules often have links to the countries 
of destination. Some wildlife traffickers reportedly also 
engage in excise fraud and drug trafficking.
28 BIRD TRAFFICKERS NETTING EUR 1 MILLION PER YEAR ARRESTED IN SPAIN 
 
The investigation initiated in 2019 uncovered how this criminal group would sell these 
endangered species to North African buyers using forged documents. The criminals would 
then arrange for the birds to be smuggled out of Spain 
hidden in buses heading to the African continent. The 
traffickers were supported by a Moroccan citizen who 
worked in a travel agency and arranged the logistics. 
They also developed their illegal business online, where 
they would sell birds but never deliver them, despite 
the buyers having paid for them. In addition, over 400 
marijuana plants were discovered during the house 
searches, indicating that this group of traffickers was 
involved in a variety of criminal activities. 
It is believed that parrot smuggling worldwide is on the rise. Some species can reach 
several hundreds of thousands of euros on the black market. The demand driving this 
illicit trade comes from collectors and breeders, but also citizens who want them as pets. 
However, this desire to own such exotic birds is killing them off. 
A number of parrot species are threatened with extinction due in part to pressures from 
collecting for the pet trade. There is however legal protection in place. All but two parrot 
species are protected under CITES, as a result of which their commercial trade is either 
prohibited or strictly regulated with export permits. 
Source: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/28-bird-traffickers-netting-
%E2%82%AC1-million-year-arrested-in-spain 
Date: 19 July 2020
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THE TRADE IN ILLEGAL  
FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES
The trade in illegal firearms is a key enabler for other 
criminal activities such as drug trafficking and amplifies 
the threat they pose to the internal security of the EU. 
Violent acts carried out using illegal firearms and public 
shooting incidents generate a sense of insecurity 
and severely undermine public confidence in national 
authorities. Some indicators allow us to assess the 
overall availability of illegal firearms in the EU. These 
include the number of shooting incidents and the quantity 
of seized firearms, both of which suggest the wide 
availability and accessibility of illegal firearms in the EU.  
 




or originate from weapon stocks outside the EU. 
In recent years, alarm and signal weapons have become 
extremely popular among criminals and feature in 
considerable figures in firearms trafficking and seizure 
cases. This is due to the fact that they can be easily 
converted into lethal weapons and are cheaper to 
procure.
Firearms are illicitly manufactured in the EU using 
clandestine workshops and gunsmiths. Firearms can be 
assembled from parts which are manufactured using 
3D technology, acquired in countries where their sale is 
allowed and illegally transported to the EU, or illegally 
produced and used with genuine weapon frames.
The reactivation of deactivated and acoustic expansion 
weapons is a common source of firearms in the EU. 
Illicit manufacture of 
firearms in clandestine 
workshops in the EU
FIREARMS TRAFFICKING




Conversion of non-lethal 
firearms to live-firing 
lethal firearms
Diversion of firearms 
from legal supply 
Weapon stocks from 
past or on-going conflicts
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The diversion of firearms from legal supply is another 
significant source of illegal firearms in the EU. This 
includes the illegal sale of historical weapons and army 
surplus material. Firearms are also acquired by targeted 
thefts from hunters, collectors and sport shooters.
Illegal firearms and their parts have been traded online 
via the surface and dark web and distributed using post 
and parcel services for some time. The online sale of 
illegal firearms appears to have shifted away from dark 
web marketplaces to forums and other platforms after 
a number of marketplaces banned the sale of firearms. 
However, the scale of the online trade in illegal firearms 
has been assessed as limited compared to their offline 
supply. In addition, many offers for illegal firearms online 
are believed to be scams. 
Various types of criminal networks are involved in the 
trade of illegal firearms in the EU. This includes EU-based 
and non-EU-based criminal networks. Criminal networks 
involved in the firearms trade typically feature the 
division of labour between members. Some members, 
such as gunsmiths, are highly specialised.
Firearms trafficking is often a subsidiary activity to drug 
trafficking. Drugs are sometimes used as currency to 
make partial payments for weapons.  
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FRAUD




Fraud offences are committed with the intention to 
defraud using false and deceitful pretexts resulting in 
the voluntary but unlawful transfer of values, goods or an 
undue advantage to the fraudsters. 
Fraud schemes targeting private citizens, small and 
medium enterprises, global corporations and critical 
infrastructure are present in all Member States(33). Fraud 
is believed to be under-reported as victimised individuals 
or companies seek to protect their brand name and 
putation rather than approach law enforcement. In 
addition, the under-reporting of fraud cases can also be 
attributed to the fact that insurance companies often do 
not compensate victims’ financial losses incurred due to 
fraud.
COLD CALLING 
Cold calling through call centers. 
Telephone operators convince 
victims to make payments, 
money transfers or advance fee 
payments under the pretext of 
fictitious stories and scenarios.
IMPERSONATION
An act of intentionally copying 
another person to deceive 
someone by pretending to be 
someone else (police officer, 




Collection, unlawful use or 
other manipulation of personal 




The fraudulent attempt to obtain 
sensitive information or data, such 
as usernames, passwords and 
credit card details, by disguising 










demand for certain products as a result of this 
crisis(34). 
The majority of investment, payment order and advance 
fee frauds are orchestrated using call centres operated 
by low-ranking members of criminal networks. Boiler 
room schemes involve criminals cold calling their 
victims. These schemes use call centres established in 
jurisdictions away from the locations of their victims, 
with the call centre fraudsters usually speaking their 
victims’ native language fluently. Fraudsters use 
social engineering techniques to manipulate human 
behaviour and exploit weaknesses to gain information 
or compliance. Their deception often relies on creating 
scenarios and stories that target victims’ vulnerabilities.  
34 Levi and Smith 2020, Australian Institute of Criminology Research Report – Fraud and its relationship to pandemics and economic crises: 
From Spanish flu to COVID-19.
The list of fraud schemes presented here is 
nonexhaustive. Fraud schemes are constantly evolving 
and the tools and techniques used to perpetuate them 
can overlap between different types of frauds, often 
making it difficult to identify and distinguish between 
different types of fraud.
 
INVESTMENT FRAUD
Investment fraud schemes result in substantial 
financial damage to private individuals and companies. 
Investment fraudsters have been increasingly targeting 
the cryptocurrency investment market by operating 
fake websites offering bogus investment opportunities. 
Fraudsters commonly seek out victims on social media 
platforms. 
FAKE INVESTORS BUSTED IN BELGIUM AND FRANCE  
 
The criminal organisation managed to set-up a sophisticated system promising big gains 
on investments in bitcoin, gold and diamonds. The suspects were offering their financial 
services on online platforms. The criminal network also set up bogus companies as a part 
of their money-laundering scheme. The network was active in Belgium and France and 
controlled by an Israeli branch. 
 
The suspects were promising between 5 % and 35 % return on investment. They then 
proceeded to pretend to manage the victims’ portfolios and invited them to invest 
more money. To increase trust in their services, they paid interest on some of the 
victims’ investments. Once the victims were won over, the fraudsters would offer bigger 
opportunities, which required higher amounts to be invested. A large French private 
company and a French local authority are among the victims of this network. The 
investments of the victims were placed on accounts in different EU Member States before 
being transferred to other international accounts. 
 
The network is believed to be responsible for frauds amounting to at least EUR 6 million. 
The investigators have also discovered invoices for a few million euros, which the 
fraudsters had not yet finalised.
Source: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/fake-investors-busted-in-
belgium-and-france
Date: 29 January 2020
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Online advertisements invite victims to open online 
trading portfolios and lure them in with initial benefits. 
However, the fraudsters extract and disappear with the 
funds shortly after. Non-existing virtual currencies are 
also advertised as an investment opportunity. This type 
of fraud in particular appears to have become more 
common across the EU over the last four years. 
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER FRAUD AND 
BUSINESS EMAIL COMPROMISE FRAUD
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) fraud is one of the most 
common types of payment order fraud. As part of this 
fraud, employees receive a payment order by email 
or a telephone call from a fraudster impersonating a 
company executive, often the CEO. The payment is 
instructed to be made out to bank accounts under the 
control of the fraudsters. 
NON-DELIVERY FRAUD
Non-delivery fraud is a variant of payment order and 
advance fee fraud. Non-delivery fraudsters use fake web 
shops to advertise and sell non-existent goods. 
During	the	first	months	of	the	COVID-19	
pandemic,	fraudsters	exploited	the	high	
demand for and low supply of personal 
protective	equipment	and	self-testing	kits.	
The number of websites and social media accounts 
fraudulently advertising these products increased 
significantly. The profits from these scams were 
significant and many of the victims were corporate and 
public entities, such as hospitals and clinics placing 
orders for supplies worth several millions of euros. 
ROMANCE FRAUD
As part of romance fraud schemes, fraudsters contact 
potential victims with the objective of taking financial 
advantage of those genuinely looking for romantic 
partners. Fraudsters work to gradually establish trust 
with the victim and soon start eliciting personal details 
such as bank accounts, credit card numbers or ask for 
money. 
FAKE INVOICE FRAUD
Fake invoice fraud, known as payment order fraud or 
ghost invoice fraud, is a form of acquisition fraud that 
involves requests for payments based on fictitious 
invoices issued to potential victims by fraudsters. This 
type of fraud relies on advertisements on sale webpages 
and the use of false, inflated or duplicate invoices. 
Criminals often impersonate legitimate suppliers and 
make a formal request to change the bank account to 
which genuine payments to that supplier are made. Fake 
invoices are sent via post and courier services or through 
emails. 
SOCIAL BENEFIT FRAUD
Social benefit fraud causes significant financial loss to 
the budgets of Member States and potentially deprives 
those genuinely in the need of aid from state support. 
Social benefit fraud can entail fraud against medical 
insurance, employment benefits, unemployment 
allowances, or allowances for low-income workers 
and refugees. As part of social dumping fraud in the 
construction and transportation sectors, criminal 
networks create fake companies and claim benefits 
for non-existing employees. In another form of this 
fraud, employees continue to work while receiving 
unemployment benefits and receiving wages under the 
table from the employer.
BANK FRAUD
The most common form of bank fraud is loan and 
mortgage fraud. Fraudsters use companies to acquire 
mortgage loans using manipulated real estate 
transactions. Criminals recruit homeless and poor 
people as strawpersons to apply for loans from banks. 
In other instances, loans are requested based on forged 
passports. Another type of bank fraud sees accounts 
taken over to execute fraudulent transactions. Mortgage 
fraud is usually linked to document fraud.
SUBSIDY FRAUD
The number of cases involving subsidy fraud cases has 
steadily increased over the years. As part of subsidy 
fraud, criminals submit fraudulent applications for EU 
grants or tenders. Typically, these applications are based 
on false declarations, progress reports and invoices used 
to justify public expenditure or the fraudulent award of 
public tenders and/or subsidies.
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Online fraud
Fraud schemes take advantage of the digital era. 
Phishing and hacking techniques are used to obtain 
personal information such as bank account information 
and banking login details from victims. Fraudsters use 
malware to intercept login details for online banking 
services. 
Fraudsters adjust fraud schemes to consumer needs 
and changes in people’s behaviour, often exploiting 
new technologies. Fraudsters increasingly use online 
platforms for social engineering. To perpetrate online 
fraud, criminals typically use tools and techniques 
linked to the authentication process to access sensitive 
information that helps them commit the frauds.
Criminal networks’ capability to react to a changing 
environment has been particularly pronounced during 
the COVID-19 pandemic, which has prompted many 
individuals to primarily shop online using digital payment 
means. Cybercriminals have quickly developed COVID-19 
themed scams and exploited the vulnerability of some 
victims to target them with investment and romance 
scams.
The move toward cashless economies creates powerful 
incentives for payment fraudsters. Cybercriminals seek 
to compromise online payments, internet and mobile 
banking, online payment requests, contactless payments 
(both card-present and not) and mobile applications. 
The increasing use of mobile devices for financial 
transactions and authentication processes has made 
them a target for cybercriminals.
The use of deepfakes will make it much more 
challenging to identify and counter fraud. Deepfakes 
mimic seemingly real photo, video and audio recordings 
of people. Fraudsters have already used voice 
impersonation as part of CEO fraud schemes and will 
likely expand the use of this technology as part of their 
criminal activities.
Customs import fraud
Customs import fraud resulted in financial losses of at 
least EUR 5.5 billion to the EU budget between 2016 and 
2019. The evasion of duties on goods imported into the 
35 European Commission 2020, Actions against imports into the EU – Anti-dumping, accessible at https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/ac-
cessing-markets/trade-defence/actions-against-imports-into-the-eu/anti-dumping/
EU negatively affects the financial interests of the EU and 
threaten legitimate companies operating in the Member 
States. Dumping practices create unfair competition to 
legitimate businesses and their products and market 
distortion.
Customs import fraud involves the false declaration of 
the value and origin of goods, and of the classification 
that applies to them. This type of fraud can be 
perpetrated by:
 • undervaluing imported goods on import declarations, 
often using fraudulent documents;
 • incorrectly clarifying products imported to the EU by 
falsely declaring the category of goods according to 
the integrated Tariff of the European Union or TARIC 
code in order to pay a lower duty rate;
 • falsely declaring the origin of goods to circumvent 
anti-dumping duties imposed by the EU on a particular 
product from a specific country;
 • dumping products on the EU market at a lower price 
than the normal value of the product. The normal 
value is either the product price as sold on the home 
market of the non-EU company, or a price based on 
the cost of production and profit(35).
Criminals carrying out customs import fraud quickly 
adapt to customs controls at the entry points of the EU 
and often have good knowledge of the Union Customs 
Code and the relevant regulatory amendments.
Excise fraud
Goods such as alcohol, cigarettes and fuel are subject 
to excise duty upon production in or on import to the 
EU. Excise duties are indirect taxes on the sale and use 
of specific products. The EU has introduced the Excise 
Movement and Control System (EMCS), which provides 
Member States with an electronic system to monitor the 
movement of excise goods in real time, to ensure that 
duties are properly levied at the final destination.
EXCISE FRAUD –TOBACCO
Significant price differences between Member States, 
and between Member States and neighbouring non-EU 
countries are the main incentives for criminal networks 
involved in this profitable criminal activity. 
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36 EU Commission 2019, Delegated Act C(2019) 2055 final, supplementing Directive (EU) 2018/2001 as regards the determination of high 
indirect land-use change-risk feedstock for which a significant expansion of the production area into land with high carbon stock is observed 
and the certification of low indirect land use change-risk biofuels, bio liquids and biomass fuels, accessible at https://ec.europa.eu/energy/
sites/ener/files/documents/2_en_act_part1_v3.pdf
FOUR METRES UNDERGROUND: ILLEGAL CIGARETTE FACTORY UNCOVERED IN A 
BUNKER IN SPAIN 
 
In February 2020, the Spanish Civil Guard (Guardia Civil) dismantled an organised crime 
group involved in illegal cigarette manufacturing and drug trafficking. The Spanish law 
enforcement officers uncovered the manufacturing facility hidden in a bunker four metres 
underground. In the facility, believed to have been operating since 2019, workers made and 
packed the counterfeit cigarettes: a complete production line under one roof. Beds and 
living quarters for the workers were also found underground. This is the first underground 
factory to be discovered in the EU. Workers there were forced to work in extremely 
dangerous and toxic conditions. Locked up four metres underground, they were not 
allowed to leave the facility on their own, and no emergency security was in place.
Over 2 million counterfeit cigarettes were seized, produced in unsanitary conditions and 
with low quality components. The criminal network is estimated to make criminal profits of 
EUR 625 000 per week.  
Source: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/four-metres-underground-illegal-
cigarette-factory-uncovered-in-bunker-in-spain
Date: 20 February 2020
Criminals benefit from the price difference and the 
proximity of the markets to smuggle illicit tobacco 
products.
Smuggled cigarettes might be original (tax and value-
added tax (VAT) fraud also arises when the goods are 
smuggled to the legal market), counterfeit, illegally 
produced within the EU, and ‘illicit whites’ produced 
legally in Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldova, North Macedonia, 
Russia, Ukraine, the United Arabic Emirates, and other 
countries. Illicit white cigarettes are illegally brought into 
the EU, without paying excise duties and VAT, and are 
placed outside legal channels, making huge profits forthe 
criminal networks. Illicit production of illicit whites in 
factories based in the EU has increased. 
 
Illicit production facilities have been discovered 
in many Member States and illicit tobacco 
products	are	increasingly	produced	in	the	EU,	
closer to their destination markets. 
EXCISE FRAUD – OIL
Excise duties on oil products are a major source of 
revenue for Member States. Different taxation is applied 
between Member States for the same oil products. The 
taxes levied on different types of oil products such as 
heating or agricultural oils is lower than the tax rate for 
diesel. Criminal networks abuse price differences as 
part of different oil fraud schemes. Fuel fraud causes 
revenue losses of billions of euros to Member States. 
The negative impact of fuel fraud on the environment is a 
significant concern in some Member States.
An	increasing	shift	to	non-fossil	fuels	will	
create additional opportunities for fuel 
fraudsters. 
A 2018 EU Commission Directive introduces exemption 
from these limits for biofuels certified as low-risk(36). 
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Criminals will exploit emerging opportunities in this area 
by abusing biofuels in fraudulent biodiesel trades. Some 
schemes may involve the sale of biofuels that have not 
been sustainably produced as sustainable fuel.
The production and use of so-called designer fuels as 
diesel is still a significant threat, although progress has 
been made in countering this issue by law enforcement 
authorities. Designer fuel is a mixture of gas oil and other 
components added to modify the physical characteristics 
of the final compound to avoid taxation. 
EXCISE FRAUD – ALCOHOL
The excise duties levied on alcohol vary across the EU, 
creating profit opportunities for excise fraud involving 
alcohol. Alcohol fraud schemes mainly target countries 
imposing comparatively higher taxes on alcohol 
products. Alcohol is smuggled across the EU using 
excise duty suspension schemes, typically described as 
(beer) carousels which abuse the EMCS system. 
Value-added tax and missing 
trader intra community fraud
Value-added tax (VAT) fraud consists of avoiding the 
payment of VAT or fraudulently claiming repayments of 
VAT from national authorities following an illicit chain of 
transactions. 
Missing trader intra community (MTIC) fraud is the abuse 
of the VAT system rules for cross-border transactions, 
involving the acquisition of goods (with ‘exemptions with 
the right to deduct’, also known as effective zero-rating) 
from another Member State which are then sold through 
a chain of companies to the consumer market with VAT 
added. The VAT is then not paid to the tax authorities. 
More complex cases of VAT fraud are known as carousel 
frauds. 
VAT fraudsters continue to generate multi-billion-euro 
profits in the EU. 
Up to EUR 50 billion are lost due to the 
activities of VAT fraudsters every year(37). 
By creating economic imbalances and market distortion, 
these criminal activities weaken the integrity of the 
national and international markets and financial systems 
and support the growth of underground economies. 
37 European Commission 2018, VAT: EU Member States still losing almost €150 billion in revenues according to new figures, accessible at 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_5787
Technology and digital infrastructure is an essential 
component in the commission of VAT fraud for different 
purposes. Criminal networks use technology to conceal 
their criminal activities, for example remote servers 
and repositories for data storage (including cloud data 
storage and servers located outside the EU), digital and 
alternative payment platforms, VPN services, encrypted 
communication and use of different internet-based 
smartphone communication applications. A developing 
area of fraud within the EU is Voice over Internet Protocol 
(VoIP) fraud, in which the internet is central to the scam.
Criminal networks can now create and run companies 
from a single device, located in any country, and conduct 
trade and submit documentation online. Free software 
is also now available to manufacture fake invoices and 
bank statements. New methods of transferring money, 
such alternative banking platforms, together with 
electronic banking services, make it more difficult to 
identify perpetrators.
Criminal networks are extremely adaptable and flexible 
in response to new measures and changes in legislation, 
the market/economic situation and law enforcement 
action. The fraudulent schemes of criminal networks 
are constantly evolving and improving in order to 
take advantage of the weaknesses of the state and 
legislation. For example, criminal networks are able to 
repurpose their supply chains easily to take advantage of 
opportunities for fraud from trading in new commodities 
and are similarly quick to refocus and change modus 
operandi (such as switching commodities or countries 
in response to legislative changes like VAT reverse-
charges). Criminals also take measures to avoid 
detection, such as substituting companies and frontmen, 
and exploiting new technological advances in order to 
incorporate companies and conceal ownership. The use 
of alternative banking platforms in carousel fraud and 
attempts to infiltrate the guarantees of origin markets 
are examples of the flexibility and adaptability of criminal 
networks active in this crime area. 
Criminal networks continue to exploit legal business 
structures to create fictitious commercial deals and use 
missing trader companies to avoid tax liabilities. 
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Criminal networks are often also active in money-
laundering activities to legalise their illicit proceeds; 
for some criminal networks, money laundering is a 
parallel activity to VAT fraud. Many criminal networks 
are involved in document fraud, most likely as part of 
the commission of VAT fraud. In cases where criminal 
networks were reported to be involved in other crime 
types, most often this related to other types of fraud.
VAT fraud is committed by professionals possessing 
good knowledge of the VAT system, legislation and tax
administration procedures. Other professionals providing 
expertise to criminal networks include legal advisors, 
customs officers, computer/ICT specialists, financial and 
economic experts, money-laundering experts, auditors 
and persons with knowledge of logistics. Setting up 
an MTIC fraud scheme in the intangible goods sector 
requires in-depth knowledge of that business and its 
regulations. Criminal networks may also recruit members 
with expertise in trading specific commodities such as 
VoIP.
PAN-EUROPEAN VAT FRAUD CRIME GROUP DISMANTLED 
 
Involving over nine EU Member States with the support of OLAF and Europol, operation 
OCTOPUS II ran between June and December 2017 and targeted criminal networks importing 
clothing and footwear from China into the EU by misusing Customs Procedure 42 00. This 
procedure entitles third-country importations to be released into free circulation with a deferred 
payment of the import VAT until the goods’ arrival with the consignee. Unfortunately, criminals 
were quick to jump on the bandwagon: the value declared by the consignee to the customs was 
on multiple occasions underdeclared, or the goods went missing along the way. Five criminal 
networks were identified, and a number of shell companies were immediately closed down and 
over 500 000 counterfeit goods were seized in France alone.
The operation revealed that this type of large-scale fraud was the work of highly knowledgeable 
and well organised criminal networks who knew the ins and outs of the logistics circuits and 
control systems to subsequently abuse them.
Source: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/pan-european-vat-fraud-crime-group-
dismantled  
Date: 2 July 2018
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MATCH FIXING AND  
BETTING-RELATED SCAMS
38 Interpol 2020, E-sports: keeping crime out of video game competitions, accessible at https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/
News/2020/E-sports-keeping-crime-out-of-video-game-competitions
Match fixing damages the integrity of sports and has a 
significant impact on sports associations, which are at 
risk of losing sponsors. Sports corruption stigmatises 
athletes and has a negative impact on the sports 
industry. 
While the percentage of fixed matches is estimated 
to be fewer than 1 % across all sports, high betting 
turnover results in millions of euros in profits for match 
fixers each year. The global annual criminal proceeds 
from betting-related match fixing are estimated at 
approximately EUR 120 million. 
A number of sports clubs experienced significant 
financial strain as a result of the restrictions introduced 
to curb the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. Many 
of these clubs operate in low-tier divisions and may 
be increasingly vulnerable to infiltration or buyout by 
criminal networks seeking to use the club for match 
fixing and other criminal purposes. 
Match fixers are likely increasingly targeting the fast-
developing e-sports market. There are indications of 
e-sport manipulation, including extraordinary surges in 
betting activity and the deposit of unusually large sums 
on a bet just ahead of e-sport matches(38).
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PEOPLE AS A COMMODITY
39 UNODC 2020, Working Group on the Smuggling of Migrants, accessible at https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/working-
group-on-the-smuggling-of-migrants-2020.html
40 EMLO 2020, Bangladesh Report 2020: Costs of Climate inaction: Displacement and Distress migration, accessible at https://actionaid.
org/sites/default/files/publications/ActionAid %20CANSA %20- %20South %20Asia %20Climate %20Migration %20report %20- %20Dec %20
2020_3.pdf
Migrant smuggling
Migrant smuggling is the process of facilitating the 
unlawful entry, transit or residence of an individual in 
a country with or without obtaining financial or other 
benefits. Migrant smuggling entails the facilitation of 
illegal entry to the EU and of secondary movements 
within the EU. It can also involve facilitating the 
fraudulent acquisition of a residence status in the 
EU. Migrant smuggling may entail land, sea or air 
transportation and often involves the use of fraudulent 
documents, including identity documents or fraudulent 
visas.
Organised migrant smuggling will remain a key activity 
for criminals, sustained by continued demand for 
facilitation services. The global population is expected 
to continue to increase, especially in some of the world’s 
most unstable regions, where economic deprivation, 
conflicts(39) and climate change(40) will serve as key push 
factors. In addition, the medium and long-term health, 
economic and political consequences of the global 
COVID-19 crisis will fuel migration towards Europe and 
will likely sustain the demand for facilitation services 
for mixed migration flows. The perception of the EU 
as comparatively more economically, politically and 
environmentally stable will remain a key pull factor. 
The proliferation of sophisticated digital technologies 
and the widespread use of social media and encrypted 
communications will create opportunities for migrant 
smugglers to propagate their services, to coordinate 
among each other and recruit victims, eluding law 
enforcement detection. The use of cryptocurrencies by 
smuggling networks has been recently reported and may 
increase in the foreseeable future. Migrant smugglers 
make frequent use of digital services and tools, such as 
social media and mobile applications for recruitment, 
communication in general and on money transfers, 
pick-ups and handover of migrants, mass-mobilisation 
of migratory movements, providing route guidance, 
sharing pictures and videos of documents and tickets, 
and monitoring law enforcement activities (via video 
surveillance and even with drones). 
Criminal networks involved in migrant smuggling are 
characterised by agility and responsiveness to changes 
in their environment. The routes and modi operandi used 
by smugglers to facilitate migrants to and within the 
EU are flexible and shift depending on circumstances 
such as weather conditions, availability of transport 
logistics and the presence of risks such as increased law 
enforcement activity or travel restrictions. 
The	COVID-19	pandemic	has	highlighted	that	
global crises do not diminish the demand for 
smuggling	services	to	enter,	transit	or	reside	in	
the EU. 
The demand for smuggling services towards Europe is 
expected to increase in the short and medium to long 
term. 
Despite the fact that irregular migrants are customers 
of migrant smugglers and willingly pay them for 
their services, they are also often victimised. Migrant 
smugglers treat irregular migrants as commodities, 
often prioritising the aim of maximising profits over 
the risks to the migrants’ physical and psychological 
health. Migrant smugglers frequently employ violence 
or the threat of violence: against migrants, against law 
enforcement officers when avoiding apprehension and 
occasionally against other smugglers active in the same 
area. Migrant smugglers put the lives of migrants at risk 
using unseaworthy vessels or concealing them in small 
confined spaces for prolonged periods. 
Facilitation services for secondary movements are high 
in demand but often remain undetected due to the use 
of dangerous modi operandi. Facilitated secondary 
movements remain a major concern for the security of 
the EU.
Approximately 50 % of the criminal groups involved in 
migrant smuggling were exclusively active in migrant 
smuggling. Migrant smugglers are on occasion also 
involved in the trafficking in human beings, drug 
trafficking, excise fraud, firearms trafficking and money 
laundering.  
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The three Mediterranean entry routes (Western, Central, 
and Eastern) are still predominantly used by smuggling 
networks to introduce irregular migrants into the EU. On 
the Western Mediterranean route, Algeria has recently 
emerged as a key departure point and the Canary Islands 
have been increasingly targeted along the West African(41) 
route . 
Migrant smuggling networks provide several services 
beside transportation, such as provision of safe houses 
41 Europol 2020, Dangerous facilitation by rubber boats from Morocco to Canaries, accessible at 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/28-arrested-for-smuggling-migrants-in-rubber-boats-morocco-to-spain
along the route and paperwork for the legalisation of 
their residence status through several means, including 
supply of fraudulent documents and/or Schengen 
visas, arrangement of marriages of convenience, false 
registered partnerships or false adoptions. Smugglers 
usually advise irregular migrants to apply for international 
protection in case of detection by law enforcement. This 
misuse of the asylum procedure enables the irregular 
migrant to temporarily legalise their residence status 
while onward facilitation is being arranged. 
MIGRANT SMUGGLING TYPOLOGIES
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23 MEMBERS OF IRAQI MIGRANT 
SMUGGLING NETWORK ARRESTED 
IN FRANCE AND THE NETHERLANDS 
 
In January 2020, France and Dutch law 
enforcement authorities, supported 
by Europol and Eurojust, dismantled 
an Iraqi migrant smuggling network 
that smuggled around 10 000 Afghan, 
Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian migrants 
from the French areas of Le Mans and 
Poitiers, to the UK. 
The migrants were transported in 
life-threatening conditions, concealed 
in refrigerated – often-overcrowded – 
lorries (up to 20 migrants in a lorry). 
The migrants paid up to EUR 7 000 for 
the dangerous journey. The payments 
were collected via an undercover 
hawala banking system run from the 
Netherlands. This migrant smuggling 
network’s illegal profits amounted to 





Date: 23 January 2020 
 
Trafficking in human beings 
(THB)
The entire process of trafficking a victim currently 
features a number of online components, both on 
the surface and dark web. This development is set to 
become even more pronounced. 
THB is a core activity of serious and organised crime 
in the EU and is set to remain a threat to the EU for 
the foreseeable future. Sustained demand for sexual 
services will continue to drive the sexual exploitation of 
victims. Similarly, the persistent demand for low-wage 
workers employed in manual jobs, both seasonal and 




labour exploitation in particular is increasing in 
the EU.
Some victims, and in some cases their family members, 
suffer from serious long-term consequences such as 
drug addiction and mental health challenges. 
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION
Traffickers abuse victims of sexual exploitation, both 
adult and underage, male and female, in clandestine 
settings and public environments such as hotels, 
bars, restaurants, sauna clubs, strip clubs, night clubs, 
massage parlours and prostitution windows. These 
premises are usually owned by associates or by 
facilitators of traffickers who also profit from exploiting 
the victims. 
Traffickers use online platforms and services to identify 
victims, orchestrate THB for sexual exploitation and 
advertise the services of victims. The use of websites 
to advertise the sexual services of victims to clients 
has become a fundamental feature of this type of 
exploitation.
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It has been assessed that there has not been a 
significant increase in THB for sexual exploitation over 
the last four years. However, the sexual exploitation of 
victims of THB takes places in all Member States. 
The origins of victims of THB used for sexual 
exploitation in the EU are highly diverse. 
Victims	of	55	different	nationalities	from	five	
different continents were reported. 
These victims are mostly female, both adult and 
underage. They are typically recruited using false 
promises of well-paid jobs abroad, to escape precarious 
living conditions, financial instability and social and 
familial hardship. 
Exploiters increasingly seek to exploit their victims in the 
context of supposedly voluntary business agreements. 
As part of these arrangements, the victims agree to 
engage in prostitution and hand over a share of their 
earnings in exchange for protection and support 
42 Europol 2018, Criminal networks involved in the trafficking and exploitation of underage victims in the EU, accessible at https://www.
europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/criminal-networks-involved-in-trafficking-and-exploitation-of-underage-victims-in-eu 
with administrative issues such as tax declarations, 
registration with chambers of commerce, or pension 
arrangements. This type of exploitation is particularly 
common in jurisdictions where sex work has been 
legalised.
Traffickers frequently use the lover boy method to 
lure underage victims into sexual exploitation. They 
increasingly meet and recruit minors online, where the 
latter can be particularly vulnerable and accessible. 
The sexual services of exploited underage victims are 
offered on dating and escort websites, where they are 
usually advertised as adults(42). Traffickers also advertise 
child victims on dedicated websites where adults are 
specifically looking for sexual encounters with minors 
(known as sugar dates). 
Minors are often abused in clandestine settings such as 
pop-up brothels. However, some exploitation also takes 
place in public venues such as hotels, restaurants, sex, 
night and strip clubs. Violence and illegal drugs are used 
to coerce victims. 
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION MAIN NON-EU COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN OF TRAFFICKING 
VICTIMS EXPLOITED IN THE EU REPORTED TO EUROPOL
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LABOUR EXPLOITATION
Trafficking in human beings for labour exploitation 
involves any work or service which is exacted from any 
person under the threat of a penalty and for which the 
person has not offered himself or herself voluntarily.
Labour exploitation occurs in various sectors of the 
economy. Some more loosely regulated sectors are 






housekeeping and domestic assistance.
The exploitation of victims of THB for labour will remain 
a feature of the serious and organised crime landscape 
in the EU for the foreseeable future. The persistent 
need for low-wage workers employed in manual jobs, 
both seasonal and throughout the year, will sustain 
opportunities for labour exploitation.
LABOUR EXPLOITATION MAIN NON-EU COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN OF TRAFFICKING 
VICTIMS EXPLOITED IN THE EU REPORTED TO EUROPOL
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FORCED CRIMINALITY AND OTHER FORMS 
OF EXPLOITATION
Traffickers abuse their victims for forced begging, 
forced criminality, the removal of organs and tissues 
and at times to obtain financial and social benefits using 
their identities. Female victims are also trafficked to 
participate in illegal surrogacy programmes, sell their 
newborns, conclude sham marriages and as victims 
of domestic slavery. As with other types of THB, the 
recruitment of victims increasingly takes place online. 
Victims are lured with false job offers, advertisements to 
marry strangers and offers to purchase babies or organs. 
Most trafficked victims are homeless, suffer from mental 
and physical disabilities, are single parents with children 
or are elderly. 
CHILD TRAFFICKING
Child trafficking is a heinous crime targeting a particularly 
vulnerable section of society. The trafficking and 
exploitation of underage victims occurs across the EU 
and targets both EU and non-EU victims. Criminals traffic 
children under various types of exploitation. Female 
victims face sexual exploitation and forced marriages 
to adult men. Traffickers exploit children as domestic 
servants, or force them to beg, pickpocket, shoplift or 
sell items. Children are also trafficked and sold through 
illegal adoption schemes. 
Criminal networks comprised of both EU and non-EU 
nationals are involved in child trafficking in the EU. 
Trafficking networks involved in child trafficking can be 
divided into three main categories: 
 • criminal networks sexually exploiting both adults and 
minors; 
 • family clans abusing their children, or children of other 
families, and forcing them into begging, criminality 
and sexual abuse; 
 • criminal groups that are mainly involved in other 
criminal activities and make use of vulnerable 
children, often of non-EU origins, to perpetrate crimes. 
PARALLEL INVESTIGATIONS BRING DOWN SEXUAL EXPLOITATION NETWORK AND 
FREEZE CRIMINAL PROFITS IN 12 COUNTRIES 
 
Spanish authorities opened an investigation in 2016 targeting a Finnish national suspected 
of human trafficking for sexual exploitation and money laundering. The main suspect, 
based in Marbella, Spain, was allegedly managing websites advertising sexual services. 
The operation was triggered by an investigation into a criminal network trafficking victims 
of predominantly Nigerian origin. The website was advertising services of victims from 
different countries based in Sweden and Finland. Other criminal networks involved in 
similar activities were also advertising the services of their victims on these websites. 
The suspected leader of the criminal group carried out criminal activities in at least 15 
countries. He used intermediaries to channel criminal proceeds to international multi-
currency bank accounts. In addition to using foreign companies and bank accounts, the 
money-laundering scheme also included relatively small investments in cryptocurrencies.
Source: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/parallel-investigations-bring-
down-sexual-exploitation-network-and-freeze-criminal-profits-in-12-counties 
Date: 10 July 2019
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The structure of the criminal networks varies according 
to the relationship between traffickers and victims. 
As for adult victims, trafficking networks are mainly 
composed of members sharing the same nationality as 
the victims(43).
Links between migrant 
smuggling and trafficking in 
human beings
Migrant smuggling and THB are sometimes seen as 
interrelated criminal offences. However, they are legally 
distinct offences. Migrant smuggling is a crime against 
the state, infringing national and international laws on 
entry, transit or residence of aliens(44). The trafficking in 
human beings is a crime against a person and violates 
fundamental human rights(45). The main criminal 
feature of migrant smuggling is the facilitation of illegal 
movement or stay of irregular migrants, whereas for 
trafficking in human beings the main crime component 
43 Europol 2018, Situation Report on Criminal networks involved in the trafficking and exploitation of underage victims in the EU, accessi-
ble at https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/criminal-networks-involved-in-trafficking-and-exploitation-of-underage-vic-
tims-in-eu
44 Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence.
45 Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human 
beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA.
is the victims’ exploitation. Exploitation includes the 
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual abuse, 
forced labour or services, including begging, slavery or 
practices similar to slavery, servitude, forcing to commit 
criminal activities, or removal of organs. 
In most smuggling cases, irregular migrants voluntarily 
pay for the criminal service in order to reach their 
desired destination. However, especially in case of 
lengthy journeys and expensive travel arrangements 
(often including the provision of fraudulent documents), 
irregular migrants agree to indebt themselves and pay 
compensation upon arrival, through exploitative work 
conditions. Sometimes smugglers agree a certain price 
with the irregular migrants upfront and later demand 
or even extort additional sums from them and/or 
their families. In other cases, criminal networks target 
migrants already residing irregularly in the EU, and force 
them to work in highly exploitative conditions, leveraging 
their vulnerability and their willingness to accept any kind 
of job opportunity to remain and have an income. 
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UNACCOMPANIED MINORS TARGETED IN RECEPTION CENTRES 
 
The organised criminal group targeted unaccompanied minors in protection centres in 
Spain. They incited the minors to escape the centres and embark on dangerous journeys 
towards western Europe. The criminal group used recruiters from different countries to 
target migrants from their own national group (Algerian, Malian, Moroccan and Syrian). 
The irregular migrants were transported from the Spanish port of Almería to France on 
buses owned by companies located in France, Morocco and Spain. The criminal group also 
used the buses to smuggle hashish, tobacco and hunting species. The goods and animals 
were hidden in holes in the vehicles, which had been specifically created to conceal their 
smuggling efforts. The investigation began with the arrest of a Spanish national in France 
who was driving a bus with 22 irregular migrants on board, six of whom were minors. 
Source: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/29-arrests-in-france-and-spain-
in-migrant-smuggling-case
Date: 17 September 2019
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DOCUMENT FRAUD
46 False and Authentic Documents Online (FADO) Glossary: A pseudo document has the appearance of an existing document, but is not 
issued by an existing and legally recognised authority of a given State or organisation, recognised under international law. Pseudo documents 
include ‘fantasy documents’ which bear the name of imaginary states or organisations; ‘camouflage documents’ which come from countries 
and organisations that no longer exist or that have been renamed; and ‘fictitious documents’ which bear the name of an existing State or 
organisation but do not correspond to any real existing document in the country or organisation indicated. 
European Commission 2020, False and Authentic Documents Online (FADO) Glossary, accessible at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-
we-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/false-and-authentic-documents-online_en  
Document fraud entails the production of false 
documents as well as the use of genuine documents 
obtained by means of deception, misrepresentation or 
theft. False documents can be complete counterfeits or 
partly forged. They can also be altered genuine stolen 
documents (including blank documents) or pseudo 
documents(46). The falsification of documents can range 
from the straightforward extraction and/or insertion of 
pages and items (e.g. the removal of entry bans and 
the insertion of photos) to chemical and/or mechanical 
interference. Most often, computers with scanners and 
printing machines are used to imitate the original security 
features of travel and ID documents. Forgers also use 
face morphing technology to digitally merge the identity 
photographs of the actual holder of a document with that 
of a potential user, allowing one document to be used by 
two separate individuals. 
Document fraud is an enabler for most criminal activities. 
This includes all types of cross-border crime, such as 
migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings as well 
as the trafficking of drugs, weapons or stolen vehicles. 
Document fraud can also facilitate general financial 
fraud, corruption, property crime and terrorism. 
Its prevalence is partly due to the fact that it does not 
necessarily require sophisticated tools or excessive 
monetary investment. Indeed, even though advanced 
technologies are occasionally used, most of the 
production can be done with standard equipment such 
as computers, scanners and printers. 
FRANCE NABS THE LEADERS OF A DOCUMENT FRAUD NETWORK ACTIVE IN THE EU 
 
A criminal network procured and distributed forged and falsified administrative documents 
to irregular migrants from North Africa based in France, Germany, Switzerland and most 
likely other EU countries. The criminal network produced the false documents in Athens 
and shipped them via courier companies. The beneficiaries, counterfeiters and suppliers 
communicated via social media networks.
The arrested gang leader, who was known to the German and Swiss law enforcement 
authorities, resided in Mulhouse, France. The suspect acted as a central interface between 
the counterfeiters in Greece and supervised a France-wide network of individuals hunting 
potential customers of illegal services. Another arrested suspect played a primary role in 
the recruitment of irregular migrants seeking false documents in the Paris region. 
Source: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/france-nabs-leaders-of-
document-fraud-network-active-in-eu 
Date: 8 October 2020
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LOOKALIKE
Used by someone other than 
the legitimate owner, based on 
physical resemblance
Criminal networks dealing 
with genuine documents 
exploit weaknesses in the 
issuance chain of 
documents and benefit 
from the ease with which 
citizens can claim new 
ones
FORGED
A genuine document with 
some alterations
COUNTERFEITED
An entirely fabricated 
document
STOLEN BLANK
From an administration and 
filled with the client’s 
biographical data
FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINED
Through false supporting 
documents or corruption
EXPIRED
Used by its legitimate owner 





UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENT 
TYPES OF DOCUMENT FRAUD
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PRODUCT COUNTERFEITING AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIME
47 Eurostat 2018, Handbook on the compilation of statistics on illegal economic activities in national accounts and balance of payments, 
accessible at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-manuals-and-guidelines/-/KS-05-17-202
Counterfeiting of goods
Counterfeiting involves the manufacturing, selling 
or distributing of goods without the brand owner’s 
authorisation. Counterfeits are often of inferior quality 
and infringe intellectual property rights. 
The levels of counterfeit goods production and 
distribution have remained stable in the EU for the last 
four years. The sale of counterfeit goods via online 
platforms has become even more prevalent and mirrors 
the increasing role of the internet as the premier retail 
avenue for legal products and services. Online trade 
offers counterfeiters direct access to consumers, thereby 
reducing the number of intermediaries while having a 
greater reach. The majority of retail activity of counterfeit 
goods takes place online, on social media, commerce 
platforms as well as on dedicated websites. It is difficult 
to assess the demand for counterfeit goods as in many 
cases consumers are unaware they are purchasing a 
counterfeit item(47).
Counterfeit goods are typically manufactured outside the 
EU and then imported for distribution in stores, markets 
or online. Counterfeit items are imported ready for sale 
or semi-finished. The import of semi-finished products, 
in which labels and packaging are imported or produced 
separately, has been increasing as this method lowers 
the risk of detection at the border. Semi-finished goods 
are then assembled and sold in the EU. 
Legal business structures are integral to the trade in 
counterfeit goods both as retail channels and to facilitate 
the movement of goods and to launder illegal profits. 
Document fraud is used widely and may involve falsified 
origin and travel documents. 
Counterfeit and substandard plant protection products 
pose a significant and growing threat to the EU. These 
products are extremely dangerous for the environment 
and can heavily contaminate agricultural land and the 
foodstuff grown on it. Pesticides are among the most 
highly regulated products due to their potential impact. 
Pesticides are used to eliminate harmful organisms in 
plants, while still being safe for the environment and 
human health. If improperly produced, they can pollute 
the air, water and soil for a long period of time. The 
impact on health is not only limited to farmers and the 
farming community, but also extends to the consumers 
of cultivated food products. Illicit pesticides can be either 
counterfeit or substandard. While counterfeit pesticides 
are illegal copies of branded products, substandard 
pesticides include all the other uncertified or fraudulent 
products. Both categories are generally placed on 
the market without having been officially tested and 
authorised by the authorities. 
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NEARLY 28 MILLION COUNTERFEIT AND ILLEGAL GOODS INCLUDING 27 MILLION 
FACEMASKS WERE SEIZED 
 
The operation led to 123 social media accounts and 36 
websites selling counterfeit products to be taken down. 
During the operation, law enforcement authorities 
seized nearly 28 million illegal and counterfeit goods 
among which were 800 000 counterfeit items of 
clothing, sportswear, footwear, personal accessories, 
IPTV set-top boxes and toys. Ten people were arrested 
in Greece and 37 others were reported to the judicial 
authorities in Greece, Italy and Portugal. More than 
EUR 700 000 was also seized. 
The COVID-19 outbreak led the involved authorities to adapt the initial scope of the 
operation to focus on issues triggered by the pandemic. As a result, counterfeit and not 
compliant medical equipment was also seized, including 27 million medical facemasks, by 
the Italian Finance Corps (Guarda di Finanza).
Source: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/no-safe-market-for-fakes-21-
countries-target-illegal-goods-in-europe-wide-sting
Date: 25 September 2020
Food and drink fraud
Food fraud is a collective term used to describe 
the deliberate and intentional substitution, addition, 
tampering, or misrepresentation of food, food 
ingredients or food packaging; or false or misleading 
statements about a product for economic gain. Criminals 
counterfeit or manipulate food products or mislead 
consumers by altering labels, geographical indications or 
manufacturing processes. The production of illicit food 
products, especially drinks, is expected to become more 
sophisticated. 
Illicit food products are increasingly marketed 
and sold online and this trend is set to continue 
to for the foreseeable future. Food products 
are increasingly mislabelled as organic. 
Food fraud results in financial losses and reputational 
damage to legal producers as well as the loss of tax 
revenues. The trade in fraudulent food products distorts 
market competition, damaging fair production and 
distribution. The use of toxic or unsafe ingredients in 
the unregulated production of food products can have 
a negative impact on the health of consumers. Some 
fraudulent food products include dangerous ingredients 
such as methanol, mercury, fipronil, insecticides or 
pesticides. The consumption of meat from ill animals 
can provoke dangerous viral infections.
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48 OECD and EUIPO 2020, Trade in counterfeit pharmaceutical products, accessible at http://www.oecd.org/gov/trade-in-counterfeit-phar-
maceutical-products-a7c7e054-en.htm
FAKE WINES SOLD UNDER EXPENSIVE ITALIAN LABELS OFF THE MARKET 
 
The investigation discovered that low quality wines were refilled in bottles under original 
labels and then sold as real ones on a big online auction platform. The wines were sold in 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the US, often ending in the glasses of unaware 
customers of wine bars and catering services. The empty authentic bottles were gathered 
from restaurants and delivered mainly by two individuals working in the food industry. 
These bottles were then refilled with cheap wines from different origins, purchased online 
or at hard discount stores. Afterwards, the bottles were sealed with corks and counterfeit 
capsules of a different or similar colour to the original. Packaging films and false masking 
guarantee seals were finally applied to conceal the lack of distinctive signs on the capsules 
used for the counterfeit units. Once a contact with a buyer was established via a large 
e-commerce platform, the counterfeiters expanded their promotional offers even further, 
setting prices far below the ones seen usually on the market. A magnum format (1.5 l) of 
some of the counterfeit wines typically exceeds EUR 1 000 per bottle. 
Source: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/fake-wines-sold-under-
expensive-italian-labels-market 
Date: 30 June 2020
Pharma crime
PPharmaceutical crime involves the manufacture, trade 
in or distribution of fake, stolen or illicit medicines and 
other pharmaceutical products, as well as medical 
devices. The use of counterfeit medicines and medical 
supplies causes significant direct harm to the health 
of victims. Pharma crime also harms pharmaceutical 
companies and reduces the funds available for research 
and development and product innovation. Clandestine 
illicit pharmaceutical production sites harm the 
environment by producing and improperly disposing of 
chemical waste(48) .
The	COVID-19	pandemic	has	prompted	a	surge	
in the trade of illicit medical supplies such as 
counterfeit	face	masks,	gloves,	hand	sanitiser	
as well as fake vaccines. Legitimate suppliers 
were initially unable to meet the sudden 
increase in demand for personal protective 
equipment	and	sanitary	products,	which	
resulted in opportunities for criminals. 
Criminals have exploited the pandemic by offering 
ineffective goods such as fake corona home test kits 
or fraudulent prescription medicines used to treat the 
disease. Soon after the news that the COVID-19 vaccine 
was ready for authorisation by health authorities, 
fraudulent offers of the vaccine appeared on the dark 
web.
The distribution of pharmaceutical goods is increasingly 
shifting from physical to online markets including 
dedicated platforms such as online pharmacies as well 
as widely used social media services. Most trading 
activity is believed to take place on the surface web. 
However, some pharmaceutical products are also 
distributed via dark web platforms. 
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Digital content piracy
Online piracy is the practice of illegally copying and 
selling digital content, such as music, books, computer 
programs and games. Piracy evolves quickly in lock step 
with other technological advances. Piracy is now almost 
exclusively a digital crime as the distribution of physical 
copies of audio-visual content has almost entirely 
disappeared. Illegal streaming and internet protocol 
television (IPTV) are the most common ways to access 
this type of content. Online offers for these illicit services 
are widely available for monthly or annual subscriptions 
and in any language. 
The use of illegal IPTV services has increased over 
recent years. The servers hosting these services are 
typically located in countries other than those where the 
49 Europol 2020, Viral marketing – Counterfeits, substandard goods and intellectual property crime in the COVID-19 pandemic, acces-
sible at https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/viral-marketing-counterfeits-substandard-goods-and-intellectual-proper-
ty-crime-in-covid-19-pandemic




subscriptions are sold(49). Demand for digital content, 
both legal and illegal, has surged during the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
The distribution of content on physical media 
is	expected	to	disappear	entirely	in	the	EU,	as	
it is replaced by more easily accessible digital 
content. Virtual currencies will be widely used 
to pay for access to pirated content. 
Legal ways of accessing online entertainment have 
multiplied and become cheaper for consumers. This 
is likely to make pirated content less attractive in the 
future(50).
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ILLEGAL STREAMING SERVICE WITH OVER 2 MILLION  
SUBSCRIBERS WORLDWIDE SWITCHED OFF 
 
TThe investigation into the activities of the criminal network started in 2019 when the 
Spanish National Police detected several websites illegally distributing audio-visual content 
in different countries across Europe, Asia and the Middle East. The distribution of the illegal 
services, in breach of intellectual property rights, was set-up as IPTV and managed from 
Spain. The criminal network was offering illegally more than 40 000 TV channels, movies, 
documentaries and other digital content via websites hosted on an international network 
of servers. The illegal service was made available through an attractive web environment 
at prices much more competitive than the ones on the legal market. The criminal network 
had even put in place a sophisticated technical assistance and quality control through an 
own customer support online platform. More than 2 million subscribers were receiving 
these illegal services, with total profits for the criminal network at an estimated EUR 15 
million. The investigation focused on shutting down the servers and disconnecting the IP 
addresses, and obtaining relevant information to effectively dismantle the criminal group. 
Source: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/illegal-streaming-service-over-2-
million-subscribers-worldwide-switched 
Date: 10 June 2020
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CURRENCY COUNTERFEITING
51 European Commission 2020, Annex to Commission decision on the financing of the Pericles 2020 Programme and the adoption of the 
work programme for 2020, accessible at https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/funding-opportunities/calls-for-funding/pericles-2020-pro-
gramme-2020-ecfin-003-c5-call_en
Currency counterfeiting includes the production and 
distribution of counterfeit currency, including the 
reproduction of individual security features.
The availability and distribution of counterfeit banknotes 
via dark web platforms has increased: various currencies 
and denominations are advertised and traded online, 
including material and equipment for illicit production, 
tutorials on how to produce counterfeit banknotes and 
information on protective elements. 
Outside the EU, the highest quality and largest quantity of 
counterfeit euros are produced in Colombia and Peru(51). 
China is the main resource country for materials (mainly 
fake holograms and other security features) for currency 








SALE OF COUNTERFEIT EURO BANKNOTES VIA ILLEGAL  
PLATFORMS ON THE DARK WEB 
 
Law enforcement authorities from 7 EU Member States carried out 36 house searches, 
detained 44 suspects for questioning, 11 of whom have been arrested, and seized 
counterfeit euro banknotes, drugs, weapons, doping substances, illegally procured 
medicines, forged documents and virtual currency. A clandestine documents print shop 
was also dismantled in Germany. Germany carried out 27 house searches and 9 other raids 
were done in Austria, France, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Spain.
These joint activities were triggered when the Portuguese Judicial Police (Polícia 
Judiciária) dismantled a digital print shop in July 2019. This Europol-supported operation 
led to the arrests of five individuals suspected of producing and distributing counterfeit 10 
and 50 euro banknotes mainly via the dark web. Over 26 000 fake banknotes were shipped 
to buyers all over Europe, making this criminal group the second-largest counterfeit 
currency producer operating on the dark web to be identified so far.
Source: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/no-crime-goes-unpunished-
darknet-11-arrested-for-buying-counterfeit-euros
Date: 16 December 2019
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ORGANISED PROPERTY CRIME
52 Eurostat 2020, Recorded offences by category – police data (crim_off_cat), accessible at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/crime/data/
database
Fencing
Fencing is knowingly buying and selling stolen goods. 
Organised property crime fundamentally relies on fences. 
However, the processes and networks behind fencing are 
largely under-investigated. Key locations and routes for 
stolen goods are currently intelligence gaps.
Criminals active in organised property crime, including 
MOCGs, either set up their own fencing arrangements 
or work with independent fences. These independent 
fences work with criminals of different nationalities.
Stolen goods such as cosmetics and phones are often 
sold via local businesses such as second-hand shops, 
phone shops, jewellery shops, pawnshops, convenience 
stores and bars. These venues can be located in the 
home country of the criminals or in the country of the 
theft or other countries depending on the availability 
of local fencing networks. Another important sales 
channel are online platforms. Stolen goods are offered 
on the surface web on marketplaces or via classified 
advertisement sites dedicated to specific goods. 
Organised burglaries and 
thefts
Organised burglaries and thefts involve the serial 
commission of burglaries and thefts by a group of 
criminals. Burglaries target all types of premises such 
as private homes, commercial and industrial or public 
buildings. Organised thefts typically involve physical 
ATM attacks, thefts from vehicles such as cargo theft, 
shoplifting, pickpocketing and metal theft. 
 
Organised property crime is likely the most 
visible	type	of	organised	crime,	with	a	direct	
impact on people and the private and public 
sector. More than one million cases related to 
burglary are reported in the EU each year(52). 
In addition to the financial impact, burglaries and thefts 
perpetuate feelings of insecurity affecting hundreds of 
thousands of EU citizens.
The COVID-19 lockdown restrictions keeping citizens at 
home and limiting travel have had a significant impact 
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on organised property crime. The number of domestic 
burglaries and common thefts has generally declined 
following the imposition of the measures(53). However, 
offenders have adapted by engaging in various types 
of schemes involving deception around the COVID-19 
pandemic. Perpetrators use techniques such as the 
impersonation of representatives from public authorities 
or medical staff to gain access to private homes 
pretending to provide information material or hygiene 
products or conducting corona tests to steal valuables. 
MOCGs continue to travel from region to region 
committing serial domestic burglaries of homes and 
53 Europol 2019, How COVID-19-related crime infected Europe during 2020, accessible at https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-doc-
uments/how-covid-19-related-crime-infected-europe-during-2020
apartments. The methods used for breaking and entering 
remain the same and include forcing windows and doors 
open using screwdrivers and crowbars, breaking locks 
by drilling into the door or window frame or climbing to 
higher floors and balconies looking for weak spots. In 
most cases, thefts are committed within a few minutes. 
Business premises such as shops, department stores, 
companies and banks are often targeted. Criminals 
continue to frequently enter premises through damaged 
walls and roofs. Ram-raids are still commonly used to 
burgle jewellery stores.  
 
MASTERMINDS BEHIND GERMAN ROOFTOP BURGLARIES HALTED IN MOLDOVA 
 
An investigation in Germany into a series of high-profile domestic burglary cases led to 
the arrest of members of a Moldovan MOCG. The offenders gained access to the victims’ 
houses by removing panels from the roof and cutting a hole to gain access. This way the 
criminals avoided the doors and windows equipped with alarm systems. The total damage 
caused amounts to more than EUR 20 million from 22 separate burglaries. 
Source: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/masterminds-behind-german-
rooftop-burglaries-halted-in-moldova
Date: 6 December 2018
At present, physical ATM attacks are only regularly 
carried out in a limited number of Member States. 
However, attackers can easily change their countries of 
activity and this means that more Member States are 
likely to be confronted by this phenomenon in the near 
future. Physical ATM attacks are attractive for criminals 
as the immediate access to cash negates the need for 
an extensive network to sell stolen goods. It is often a 
convenient alternative for criminals already active in 
organised property crime. Although the success rate for 
attacks on ATMs is not very high, a single successful 
attack will result in a high return in most cases.
Cargo crime is the illicit acquisition of any type of cargo 
in transit from producer to distributor to customer, stolen 
during freight transport or from storage facilities that 
are part of the supply chain. Cargo crime entails theft or 
fraudulent acquisition when goods are diverted from their 
original destination. The losses caused by cargo crime in 
the eight most affected Member States exceeded EUR 75 
million in 2019 and have a significant impact on supply 
chains.
Organised pickpocketing and distraction thefts continue 
to be carried out, targeting victims’ mobiles phones and 
wallets in crowded places such as concerts, markets, 
public transport and railway stations. Criminals also 
engage in ‘shoulder surfing’ or ‘shouldering’, targeting 
elderly citizens to steal their debit card by distraction 
after looking over their shoulder to see the PIN.
Various scams and schemes are still used, such as 
fake officials, including false police officers and fake 
corona teams, and the nephew or grandchild trick, to 
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target mainly elderly persons. During the COVID-19 
pandemic, some perpetrators adapted their schemes to 
pretend to be sick relatives in need of money. Some also 
impersonate healthcare and law enforcement officials to 
gain access to homes.
Metal theft is driven by high prices for metal. Criminals 
monitor metal prices and carry out metal thefts when 
potential profits are most promising. In most cases, 
metal theft only requires simple construction tools, 
limited expertise and access to scrap dealers. Criminals 
target railway cables and churches for copper as well 
as the catalytic converters of vehicles for other precious 
metals.
Organised property crimes carried out in the EU continue 
to be perpetrated primarily by MOCGs. Mobility remains 
the key characteristic of these MOCGs and is used to 
avoid detection and minimise the risk of apprehension. 
MOCGs travel long distances and are typically active in 
several countries. They are highly flexible in the selection 
of their targets and will often change their country of 
activity to evade law enforcement or to respond to 
changes in the criminal landscape. 
Organised robberies
A robbery is the felonious taking of property from another 
person or in his or her immediate presence, against his or 
her will, by violence or intimidation.  
Organised robberies include robberies committed by 
criminal groups. In addition to the obvious psychological, 
physical and financial harm inflicted on victims of 
robbery, robberies also have a significantly negative 
effect of undermining the perception of public security, 
which indirectly reflects on the demographic and 
economic development of affected regions.
Violence is an integral part of the modus operandi of 
robbery and mainly involves the intimidation of shop 
owners, employees, customers and witnesses with 
firearms or other objects such as explosives, knives, axes 
or baseball bats. Attacks on cash transports sometimes 
involve the use of arms. The firearms used include 
pistols, rifles, assault rifles, automatic rifles, machine 
pistols, reactivated guns, air guns, gas pistols but also 
faithful copies such as plastic pistols.
There has been a shift from more secure targets, such as 
banks, towards less secure targets, including small local 
shops such as pharmacies or convenience stores. Elderly 
people are increasingly targeted in their homes. 
Robberies have seen little or no changes in terms of modi 
operandi. Organised robberies are usually well prepared. 
The targets are scouted for days or even months, escape 
routes are planned and sometimes measures are taken 
to keep law enforcement at a distance. Robbers engage 
in hit and run tactics, use masks, dark clothes and gloves 
to disguise their identity and quickly leave the crime 
scene often via a different route than the route of arrival.
HUGGER MUGGERS ROB JEWELLERY AND LUXURY WATCHES 
 
An international investigation led to the detection and arrest of 10 members of a criminal 
network specialised in the robbery of jewellery and luxury watches. The network used 
over 1600 stolen vehicles to commit these robberies. Some members had no fixed 
residence and were active throughout Europe. The criminals preyed on elderly and 
vulnerable individuals. The gang approached their victims in stolen vehicles, when one of 
the suspects, usually a woman, would get out the car and talk to the potential victim. The 
criminal would then hug the victim and snatch their jewellery.
Source: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/over-1-600-vehicles-worth-
%E2%82%AC13-million-used-to-commit-robberies 
Date: 24 May 2019
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Organised robbers mostly target businesses with limited 
security arrangements in place, such as small banks, 
cash-intensive businesses or shops selling high-value 
goods. No special expertise is required to target these 
premises. Business targets include jewellery stores, 
pharmacies, electronic goods stores, clothing stores, 
banks, post offices, exchange offices, petrol stations and 
convenient stores. 
Organised robberies are perpetrated by 
internationally	active	MOCGs	as	well	as	local	
criminals depending on the Member State and 
region.	MOCGs	are	highly	mobile,	travel	long	
distances to quickly execute robberies and 
leave the country of operation. 
Hierarchically structured criminal networks such as 
thieves-in-law, Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMCGs) and 
clan-based criminals are active in organised robberies. 
Motor vehicle crime
Motor vehicle crime includes the theft or fraudulent 
acquisition (embezzlement, rental or lease fraud, 
insurance fraud) of vehicles or vehicle parts. Vehicles 
stolen in the EU are recovered mainly either in the country 
of the theft or in another Member State within a few 
days after the theft while still in transit. Only a very small 
percentage of stolen vehicles are recovered from outside 
the EU. 
The declining trend in motor vehicle crime has been 
attributed to improved security measures implemented 
by vehicle manufacturers, law enforcement activities and 
the more extensive use of the European Car and Driving 
License Information System (EUCARIS) which enables 
countries to share vehicle and driving licence registration 
information.
Motor vehicles are illegally acquired by criminals either 
by theft or through fraud. Stolen vehicles are sold as 
such or for parts. The technical arms race between 
manufacturers and criminals is set to continue as 
motor vehicles are becoming more vulnerable to 
cyberattacks targeting the many digital components of 
modern vehicles. Vehicle security has further improved 
and requires most vehicle thieves to rely on electronic 
compromise of the vehicle systems. 




alarms and tracking systems. 
Member States continue to see an increase in 
the number of incidents related to the fraud and 
embezzlement of motor vehicles due to low down-
payment requirements for the leasing or financing of 
vehicles and the accessibility of consumer credit. The 
most common fraud and embezzlement method is the 
leasing or purchase of a vehicle on loan using fraudulent 
documents and then disappearing with the vehicle and 
defaulting on payments. 
To enable their transportation and sale, stolen vehicles 
receive a new identity and the identification features of 
vehicle parts are removed in most cases. Legislative 
loopholes in importation and registration procedures 
allow the re-registering of stolen cars. In order to do 
this, criminals change number plates, falsify vehicle 
identification documents and the vehicle identification 
numbers. 
Criminals involved in motor vehicle crime rely on the 
complicity of corrupt officials in registration offices, 
vehicle inspection experts, customs officials and staff 
of insurances companies to legalise the status of stolen 
vehicles.
Vehicles are typically transported on their own wheels. In 
some cases, shipping companies are used to transport 
stolen vehicles over land on cargo trains or lorries or 
via sea in container ships. Stolen vehicle parts are 
transported in vans and lorries.
Vehicles are trafficked through a number of layers before 
reaching the final buyer. Criminals use legal business 
structures for a variety of purposes related to the 
purchase and sale of stolen vehicles and stolen vehicle 
parts. Sales channels include official car dealers, second-
hand car dealers, vehicle repair shops as well as trade 
fairs or unofficial garages. Stolen vehicles and parts 
are increasingly sold online via a variety of platforms, 
including social media. The online business-to-business 
market for spare parts is expected to grow significantly 
in the coming years; criminals may seek to use these 
channels to sell their stolen goods. 
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The illegal trade in cultural 
goods
Cultural goods crime or the illegal trade of cultural 
goods includes three main criminal phenomena. Theft 
and robbery of original cultural goods; looting, the illicit 
removal of ancient relics from archaeological sites, 
buildings or monuments and illegal trade of these; and 
forgery, the illegal imitation of cultural goods from a 
specific artist or historical period for financial benefit 
by offering them with false features. The trafficking in 
cultural goods is assessed to remain a stable criminal 
activity, with demand sustaining trafficking activities 
at the same or potentially increasing levels for the 
foreseeable future. 
Cultural goods traffickers have profited from a 
diversification of sales channels online, such as online 
auctions, flea markets and private sales sites, to expand 
their customer base. Stolen masterpieces are still traded 
through traditional black market channels while online 
marketplaces (social networks, classified ads websites) 
offer criminals new opportunities to sell lower value 
items that were previously not in demand.
Most commonly, cultural goods are stolen during 
burglaries or by theft by deception from places of 
worship, cultural heritage institutions, museums, private 
homes and private collections. Some of the thefts are 
carried out on the request of a sponsor. In some cases, 
stolen goods are replaced with forgeries. Theft by 
deception involves the use of false identity documents 
to gain access to secured premises such as archives, 
libraries or archaeological excavation sites to remove 
objects. 
23 ARRESTS AND AROUND 10 000 
CULTURAL ITEMS SEIZED IN AN 
OPERATION TARGETING ITALIAN 
ARCHAEOLOGICAL TRAFFICKING  
 
When dismantling an international 
organised crime group of 23 members 
involved in large-scale trafficking 
of looted archaeological items, law 
enforcement authorities seized 
around 10 000 cultural items during 
80 house searches. The network was 
active for many years and caused 
significant damage. The items were 
stolen from archaeological sites 
in Calabria, southern Italy, where 
the cultural heritage stems from 
the Greek and Roman period. The 
different rings of the network, led by 
two Calabrians living in the province 
of Crotone, included looters, fences, 
intermediaries and mules operating 
from different Italian regions. The 
key facilitators were also acting from 
Djion, Munich, London and Vršac, 
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QUO VADIS? AN OUTLOOK ON SERIOUS AND ORGANISED CRIME
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
 
Serious and organised crime is both resilient and 
versatile  and continues to evolve and adapt to reduce 
the risks to its own business, maximise profits, exploit 
new opportunities and evade law enforcement attention. 
In trying to anticipate the development of criminal 
phenomena in the EU, it is crucial to look at the broader 
changes in the environment in which crime takes place. 
In November 2020, a group of subject-matter experts 
from across various disciplines engaged in a systematic 
foresight exercise to identify key developments in the 
EU over the next five years. The exercise was followed 
by exchanges between law enforcement experts on the 
possible impact of these developments on the security 
of the EU. The developments outlined below are the 
outcome of this exercise.
DIGITALISATION
The EU is on a path towards total digitalisation – a 
development that will continue at a fast pace with 
significant impact on society, public administration, 
transport and trade. The COVID-19 pandemic has further 
accelerated this phenomenon. Substantial investments 
in infrastructure will be necessary to complete the 
transition to the digital era. Currently, Member States 
are progressing at different speeds in building up digital 
infrastructures; this may lead to potential vulnerabilities.
Government services are increasingly delivered digitally. 
Member States’ government authorities are likely to 
increasingly offer services digitally to cut costs and 
enhance their accessibility. 
Digitalisation is set to further increase the volume of 
digital personal data, which is mostly held by private 
companies. There is a risk that the exponential increase 
in data will overwhelm governments who are unable to 
manage, safeguard and effectively use this information. 
Cybercriminals will launch sophisticated and large-scale 
attacks against critical infrastructure to access and steal 
sensitive data.
54 Deepfakes are media in which a person is replaced with someone else’s likeness. Deepfakes leverage powerful techniques from machine 
learning and AI to manipulate or generate visual and audio content with a high potential to deceive.
55 Forbes 2020, Deepfakes Are Going To Wreak Havoc On Society. We Are Not Prepared [25/05/2020], accessible at https://www.forbes.
com/sites/robtoews/2020/05/25/deepfakes-are-going-to-wreak-havoc-on-society-we-are-not-prepared/?sh=5534e7b67494
States risk ceding control over many areas of finance 
and the economy to the private companies that dominate 
the digital space. Leading technology companies will 
entrench their monopoly positions, drawing on financial 
resources and superior engineering capacities.
The monopoly on data held by third parties will continue 
to pose increasing risks of manipulation and criminal use 
of personal information. Privacy and the ethical use of 
data are key topics to be addressed by law enforcement, 
legislators and policy makers.
Widespread adoption of cryptocurrencies by legitimate 
businesses and individuals could have a significant 
impact. Law enforcement authorities will need to 
find new ways to access information on financial 
transactions between criminals.
As digitalisation increases, so do the challenges from 
the increasing spread of misinformation, fake news 
and conspiracy theories. The use of deepfakes(54) will 
probably become a serious challenge for the digital 
environment(55). Law enforcement authorities have 
limited powers to counter information manipulation, 
which can take the form of attempts to distort political 
discourse, manipulate elections, erode democratic 
principles, sow distrust in institutions, intensify social 
divisions, foster insecurity, and spread discrimination 
and xenophobia.
GEOPOLITICAL FACTORS 
Recognising the internal-external security nexus is crucial 
in trying to understand upcoming challenges to the 
EU’s internal security. The EU continues to engage with 
partners globally. 
China’s influence on trade, infrastructure and security 
at a global level, particularly in the Middle East, Central 
Asia and Africa, will shape the EU’s foreign policy and 
security stance, including as regards the EU’s internal 
security. This development will necessitate stronger 
European security autonomy and greater cooperation 
between national authorities in all security domains such 
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as defence, intelligence and law enforcement. EU-based 
criminals will look to China for criminal opportunities 
while Chinese organised crime will use the country’s 
footprint across the world to intensify their criminal 
operations outside China.
There is still significant conflict potential on the periphery 
of the EU, with active conflicts in Ukraine and between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as instability in Libya, the 
Sahel region and the eastern Mediterranean area. 
Stability	in	certain	post-conflict	areas	remains	
fragile and there is a risk of relapsing into 
active	conflicts	should	conditions	deteriorate.	
Active conflicts may cause further mass migration 
movements towards the EU, fuelling the migrant-
smuggling industry that has emerged over recent years.
THE GREEN TRANSITION 
The green transition is the move towards a less resource-
intensive and more environmentally sustainable way of 
life touching on all aspects of the economy, society and 
technology. The green transition is an opportunity for 
innovation and economic success. The financial system 
and green sectors will be increasingly interlinked. 
Criminals	will	seek	to	profit	from	this	




Waste management and recycling will become key 
sectors. A circular economy means a longer life span 
for goods and full waste-recycling systems will mean 
waste dismantling will be carried out within the same 
territory as production. Illicit waste management 
will be a significant growth sector as prices for legal 
waste management services will continue to increase. 
Illicit waste management can involve the unlawful 
reintroduction of waste in production cycles, the resale of 
hazardous waste mixed with other waste or the reuse of 
waste products as second-life goods. 
Food security and food safety will become increasing 
concerns. Environmental crimes with significant impact 
on biodiversity (such as illegal fishing, illegal logging, 
and wildlife poaching) are very difficult to detect. Fraud 
related to food and the distribution of counterfeit 
products and beverages will increase, leading to a 
decline in consumer trust. 
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THE LONG-TERM IMPACT  
OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
56 Europol 2020, Viral marketing, accessible at https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/viral-marketing-counterfeits-sub-
standard-goods-and-intellectual-property-crime-in-covid-19-pandemic 
The COVID-19 pandemic has been a crisis of an 
unprecedented nature. The pandemic has proven to be 
more than a global public health crisis and has resulted 
in considerable changes in the serious and organised 
crime landscape in the EU and beyond. Criminals have 
quickly capitalised on these changes by shifting their 
market focus and adapting their illicit activities to the 
crisis context. The immediate impact of the COVID-19 
crisis has been most visible in the counterfeiting and 
distribution of substandard goods, cybercrime, organised 
property crime, and various types of fraud schemes.
The mid- to long-term consequences of the pandemic will 
result in further vulnerabilities. A prolonged pandemic will 
put a heavy strain on European and global economies, 
with indications that some countries are already entering 
an economic downturn. Learning from previous crises, 
it can be anticipated that a volatile economic situation 
with growing poverty and social inequality will serve 
as a breeding ground for organised and serious crime. 
Criminals will intensify their activities to fully exploit 
emerging vulnerabilities, in order to compensate for lost 
profit during the lockdown period. Criminals will continue 
to rely on the use of new technologies and further expand 
their technical capabilities. 
Criminal groups have quickly adapted to profit from the 
new business opportunities the pandemic economy 
has presented, taking advantage of the increased and 
widespread demand for certain products. The supply 
of counterfeit and substandard medical equipment as 
well as sanitary and pharmaceutical products increased 
significantly both on the surface and dark web(56). 
The pandemic has clearly highlighted the dynamic nature 
of cybercrime. Since the outbreak of the pandemic, an 
increased number of COVID-19-related domains have 
been created to support different cybercrime activities. 
The number of cyber-enabled and pandemic-related 
scams, COVID-19-themed malware, ransomware and 
phishing attacks notably increased during the pandemic, 
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targeting individuals, businesses and the health sector 
alike (57). With the roll out of COVID-19 vaccination 
campaigns, it is expected that the number of vaccine-
specific cybercrime activities will surge, including 
cyberattacks on pharmaceutical research. 
The impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the drug markets 
has been relatively limited. Aside from initial and 
localised disruptions in the supply and distribution of 
drugs during the first lockdown, the trafficking of drugs 
has continued(58). Despite fluctuations in the price and 
supply of drugs on the European market early in the 
pandemic, the drug market has largely returned to pre-
pandemic levels.
The	long-term	consequences	of	the	pandemic	
may manifest particularly severely in the area 
of	financial	crime(59). Businesses operating 




Money laundering poses a high risk in times of financial 
crises. Criminals may increasingly attempt to launder 
money through dormant companies, buy out financially 
57 Europol 2020, How COVID-19 related crime infected Europe in 2020, accessible at https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-docu-
ments/how-covid-19-related-crime-infected-europe-during-2020
58 Pandemic profiteering – How criminals exploit the COVID-19 crisis, accessible at https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-docu-
ments/pandemic-profiteering-how-criminals-exploit-covid-19-crisis
59 Levi and Smith 2020, Australian Institue of Criminology Research Report – Fraud and its relationship to pandemics and economic crises: 
From Spanish flu to COVID-19.
60 Based on the contribution by the Working Group on COVID-19 criminal threats and law enforcement responses 1st meeting;  Europol 
2020, Enterprising criminals: Europe’s fight against the global networks of financial and economic crime, accessible at https://www.europol.
europa.eu/publications-documents/enterprising-criminals- %E2 %80 %93-europe %E2 %80 %99s-fight-against-global-networks-of-financial-
and-economic-crime
61 Europol 2020, Beyond the pandemic – how COVID-19 will shape the serious and organised crime landscape in the EU, accessible at 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/beyond-pandemic-how-covid-19-will-shape-serious-and-organised-crime-landscape-
in-eu
62 Europol 2020, How COVID-19 related crime infected Europe in 2020, accessible at https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-doc-
uments/how-covid-19-related-crime-infected-europe-during-2020; Based on the contribution by the Working Group on COVID-19 criminal 
threats and law enforcement responses 1st meeting.
affected cash-intensive businesses, or invest in property 
in the construction sector(61). As a result of heightened 
pressures exerted on banks during an economic crisis, 
due diligence procedures may be weakened elevating 
the risk of loan fraud. Money launderers may also 
increasingly misuse online financial services and 
virtual assets to conceal their illicit proceeds. Trade-
based money-laundering activities are also expected to 
intensify.
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to a considerable 
increase in the output of sanitary and medical waste, 
posing a significant risk to the environment and public 
health alike(62). A reduction in the number of inspections 
and controls of waste shipments by supervisory 
authorities enabled some criminals to traffic and illegally 
dispose of waste. Widespread economic hardship 
may open up additional opportunities for illicit waste 
traffickers. A general decline in corporate revenues 
may entice companies to take advantage of such illicit 
services in order to reduce waste disposal costs. 
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THE POTENTIAL IMPACT  
OF A GLOBAL ECONOMIC RECESSION 
63 Financial Times 2021, Kristalina Georgieva: ‘We are in a resilient place but cannot take stability for granted’ accessible at https://www.
ft.com/content/74cdb0f1-02ed-408f-ad19-6a6c7408d637
64 Deloitte 2021, Weekly global economic update accessible at https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/economy/global-economic-out-
look/weekly-update.html
65 The World Bank 2021, Global Economic Prospects accessible at https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects
66 Politico 2021, Two options for Europe’s coronavirus economy: Bad or a lot worse accessible at https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-
rope-2021-coronavirus-economy-bad-or-worse/
67 The World Bank 2021, Global Economic Prospects accessible at https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects
68 Bloomberg 2021, Double-Dip Recession Beckons in Europe as Lockdowns Drag On, accessible at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2021-01-12/euro-area-heads-for-double-dip-recession-as-lockdowns-drag-on
The global COVID-19 pandemic and the restrictions 
imposed to stop the spread of the disease have been 
widely forecast to result in a deep and severe economic 
recession on a global scale. The EU will be significantly 
affected by this development. A severe economic 
recession or even depression may shape the serious and 
organised crime landscape in the EU for years to come.
Previous experiences from times of severe economic 
crisis, such as the financial crisis of the late 2000s and 
early 2010s, allow us to anticipate how another such 
economic crisis may influence the threat from serious 
and organised crime.
The economic downturn created by the global COVID-19 
pandemic is expected to last well beyond 2021. 2020 
saw the worst recession since the Great Depression(63). 
The restrictions imposed to curb the spread of the 
coronavirus slowed down economic activity, resulting 
in a fall in consumer spending, retail sales and 
employment(64). The level of output is expected to remain 
below its pre-pandemic levels for a prolonged period 
of time(65). Some of the hardest hit industries, such as 
aviation, hospitality, culture and leisure, have yet to 
experience the full impact of the crisis, due to current 
government support schemes and stimulus packages(66). 
The economic outlook remains bleak. The World Bank 
estimates that by 2025, output will still be 5% below its 
pre-pandemic trend, which could lead to a cumulative 
output loss equal to 35% of world output in 2019(67). 
ING Groep NV has estimated that the economy will not 
return to its pre-pandemic levels until at least 2023(68). 
The EU and Member States have established support 
and recovery funds on an unprecedented scale in order 
to mitigate the potentially catastrophic impact of a 
recession following the COVID-19 pandemic. The funds 
aim to support private companies of all sizes, the self-
employed, non-profit organisations and private citizens. 
These funds have already been targeted by fraudsters 
seeking to illegally access these billion of euros of 
resources. While safeguards are in place to prevent 
abuse at national and European level, authorities have 
had to distribute these support payments so fast that 
this has weakened some of the due diligence procedures 
and already allowed some criminals to illegally benefit 
from these funds. Member States and the EU will seek 
to further support European economies with offers of 
financial and other support. It is expected that some 
criminals will specialise in abusing these vital schemes 
by orchestrating complex networks of companies in 
order to defraud public funds.
The potential loss of billions of euros of  public revenues 
through VAT and other frauds directly affects taxpayer 
interests and the ability of governments to fund essential 
public services. Rising unemployment, reductions in 
legitimate investment and further constraints on the 
resources of public authorities may combine to present 
greater opportunities for criminal groups, as individuals 
and organisations in the private and public sectors are 
rendered more vulnerable to compromise.
The weak capitalisation of some EU-based companies 
due to the economic crisis may make them vulnerable to 
takeovers by criminals based inside and outside the EU 
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seeking a conduit to broaden their EU operations. Foreign 
investments in EU companies are largely positive and 
provide an influx of capital used to develop corporate 
structures and markets in the EU. However, they also 
entail the risk of EU economies being infiltrated with 
criminal funds generated outside the EU. This can allow 
criminals to establish a foothold in EU markets to the 
detriment of legally operating EU companies drawing on 
funds from legitimate sources. Extensive cooperation 
with compromised specialists in the legal and financial 
sectors underpins this activity, particularly in regard to 
investment firms and money service businesses. Here, 
too, employees are likely to experience the effects of a 
global economic crisis and may be more vulnerable to 
compromise by criminals.
A global economic crisis may bring ordinary 
EU	citizens	into	closer	proximity	to	organised	
crime. Communities may become more 
tolerant of certain types of crime such as 
the distribution of counterfeit goods or the 
cultivation of cannabis. 
This may also make individuals more vulnerable 
to recruitment by criminal groups due to a lack of 
alternative legal prospects. Young people with advanced 
technical skills who are unable to gain employment in 
their chosen fields of expertise may turn to crime in order 
to finance themselves. This may result in a significant 
increase in the number of individuals engaging in 




The SOCTA 2021 is a comprehensive assessment 
of criminal threats facing the EU. As part of the 
development of the SOCTA, Europol carries out 
comprehensive data collection together with Member 
States and third partners. Europol also makes extensive 
use of the rich data sets already available at Europol 
in the form of its databases, case work and in-house 
expertise. Europol also seeks input from the private 
sector and academia in order to broaden the analysis.
All these elements result in sophisticated analysis 
and assessment of criminal threats in the EU. All the 
criminal phenomena discussed in the SOCTA 2021 
are serious criminal threats. However, it is Europol’s 
role to identify those that represent the most pressing 
and highest level of threat based on a transparent and 
consistent methodology. The methodology used to 
prepare the SOCTA and the prioritisation process has 
been developed based on customer requirements in 
close cooperation with Member States represented in 
the SOCTA Advisory Group and confirmed by the EU’s 
Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on 
Internal Security (COSI).
Europol has identified the following phenomena as key 
crime threats facing the EU:
 • high-risk criminal networks (incl. corruption, money 
laundering, and the use of firearms)
 • cyberattacks
 • crimes against persons
 • drugs
 • fraud
 • property crime
 • environmental crime
The organised crime landscape is characterised by a 
networked environment where cooperation between 
criminals is fluid, systematic and driven by a profit-
oriented focus. A key characteristic of criminal networks, 
once more confirmed by the pandemic, is their agility 
in adapting to and capitalising on changes in the 
environment in which they operate. Obstacles become 
criminal opportunities and may be as simple as adapting 
the narrative of a known modus operandi.
High-risk criminal networks can use corruption as an 
intrinsic part of their business model and to target public 
servants or sectors in strategic positions. Corruption 
erodes the rule of law, weakens institutions of states 
and hinders economic development. Corruption 
is a key threat to be addressed in the fight against 
criminal networks involved in any area of serious and 
organised crime. High-risk criminal networks in the EU 
fundamentally rely on the ability to launder vast amounts 
of criminal profits. For this purpose, professional money 
launderers have established a parallel underground 
financial system to process transactions and payments 
isolated from any oversight mechanisms governing the 
legal financial system. This parallel system ensures 
criminal proceeds cannot be traced as part of a 
sophisticated criminal economy, which allows high-risk 
criminal networks to flourish financially.
The threat from cyberattacks has been increasing over 
the last year not only in terms of the number of attacks 
reported but also in terms of the sophistication of 
attacks. Cyber-dependent crime is likely significantly 
underreported. The rapidly progressing digitalisation 
of society and the economy constantly creates new 
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opportunities for criminals involved in cyberattacks. The 
availability of cybercrime services online as part of a 
crime-as-a-service business model makes cybercrime 
more accessible by lowering the technological expertise 
required to carry out these crimes.
Migrant-smuggling networks increasingly put the 
physical and psychological integrity of irregular migrants 
in danger, aiming at maximising profits and reducing 
time and operational costs. Facilitation services for 
secondary movements are in high demand. Migrant-
smuggling networks prove to be highly adaptable and 
able to quickly modify their business model and routes 
in response to evolving law enforcement activity, travel 
restrictions, logistical and environmental changes. 
Highly organised smuggling networks also have 
connections or internal capabilities to exploit irregular 
migrants after they have arrived to their destination, 
through debt bondage. The online environment has 
become key to the recruitment and advertisement of 
trafficked victims for sexual exploitation and is serviced 
by brokers who maintain online platforms and capitalise 
on offering services both to criminal networks and to 
clients of sexual services.
The trafficking in human beings for labour exploitation 
remains underreported.  Economic insecurity creates 
opportunities for traffickers to recruit/target victims in 
countries featuring high levels of unemployment, low 
average levels of education and poor awareness of 
labour rights.  
Cocaine trafficking is a key activity for high-risk criminal 
networks active in the EU. EU-based criminal networks 
involved in cocaine trafficking have expanded their 
operations to have global reach. The number of violent 
incidents related to the trade in cocaine has been 
increasing. The nature of these attacks is also escalating 
in terms of impact and of victims, which now include 
journalists, lawyers, bystanders and others not involved 
in the cocaine trade. The cocaine market is a major 
source of income for criminals and enables the criminal 
infiltration of the licit economy.
Cannabis remains the most widely consumed illegal 
drug in the EU. The average potency of cannabis has 
increased over the last decade resulting in increasing 
potential harms to EU consumers. The cannabis market 
is a major source of profit for serious and organised 
crime in the EU. Criminal networks are heavily involved 
in the cultivation and trafficking of cannabis. The herbal 
cannabis cultivation close to the EU and within the EU 
has increased further. Relying on advanced agricultural 
cultivation equipment, criminal networks operating 
professional cultivation sites have been able to further 
increase their harvest yields. Cannabis resin continues to 
be trafficked in large quantities from Morocco to the EU.
The trade in synthetic drugs in the EU is unique 
compared to other substances as the production of 
these drugs in most cases takes place in the EU and 
they are subsequently distributed on a global level and 
European markets. The production of synthetic drugs in 
the EU is expanding and is expected to continue to do 
so in the near future. The criminal networks involved in 
the production of synthetic drugs have demonstrated 
their resilience and capacity to adapt to changes such 
as the banning of specific (pre-)precursor substances 
and essential chemicals by adjusting their production 
processes.
New fraud typologies are related involve online tools and 
digital techniques. Online fraud schemes feature diverse 
typologies. These may include, but are not limited to BEC 
fraud, which targets businesses and organisations and 
continues to increase in the number of attempts and 
their sophistication; SIM Swapping and smishing; online 
investment fraud, increasingly involving cryptocurrencies; 
phishing, which remains a significant threat and is further 
evolving in sophistication.
The overall number of incidents of organised property 
crime remains high, especially for domestic burglaries 
with more than one million cases a year, directly 
affecting hundreds of thousands of citizens. Criminals 
involved in organised property crime continue to travel 
long distances from region to region and country to 
country committing organised property crime. They 
easily shift between different types of burglaries and 
thefts.
Criminals primarily use companies to perpetrate 
environmental crimes. Criminals will increasingly seek 
to infiltrate and exploit the recycling and renewable 
energy industries. These two sectors are set to grow 
substantially and will attract both private sector 
investment as well as public funding. 
Serious and organised crime remains a key security 





The SOCTA methodology was developed by Europol 
in cooperation with the SOCTA Advisory Group 
composed of representatives of the Member States, 
EU agencies, third partner organisations, the European 
Commission and the Council General Secretariat. The 
SOCTA methodology is reviewed and amended by 
the SOCTA Advisory Group on a continuous basis. In 
2019, new customer requirements were agreed for the 
preparation of the SOCTA 2021 and endorsed by the 
Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on 
Internal Security (COSI)(69). Based on these customer 
requirements, an updated, reviewed and improved 
methodology was agreed and implemented.
AIM AND SCOPE OF THE SOCTA
The aim of the SOCTA methodology is to help assess 
the key threats and understand the risks of serious 
and organised crime in the EU in a consistent way. The 
threat of serious and organised crime is determined 
by the activities of the organised crime groups and 
other criminal actors in different crime areas, its impact 
and geographical dimension and the use of crime 
infrastructure. The risk is determined by exploitable 
weaknesses or relevant developments in the environment 
(crime-relevant factors as drivers and facilitators of 
crime) and by their likelihood and consequences of 
change.
The conceptual model has four distinct steps of the 
SOCTA methodology: the focus, the tools (indicators), 
the analysis and prioritisation, and the result.
69 Council Document 9038/19, SOCTA Customer requirements (14/05/2019).
There are three integrated steps during the analysis. 
First, the identification of all current threats related 
to  serious and organised crime, including the crime 
infrastructure used and geographical aspects. Secondly, 
the identification of exploitable weaknesses or relevant 
developments in the environment. Thirdly, the foresight 
based on the likelihood and consequences of change 
to identify key future threats. The key future threats are 
those threats in which the probability and impact are 
highest.
The SOCTA is focused on the following key areas which 
are also the starting point for the data collection:
 • OCGs and other criminal actors; 
 • serious and organised crime areas;
 • impact;
 • crime infrastructure;
 • the environment in which the criminal activities are 
embedded.
DATA SOURCES
Europol carries out internal and external data collection 
for SOCTA. Data for the purposes of SOCTA analysis 
is collected based on the three focus areas: OCGs and 
other criminal actors, serious and organised crime areas 
and the environment.
The reporting period covers the time from the last of the 
data collection for the SOCTA 2017 in January 2016 
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to December 2019. Contributors were asked asked to 
provide information on emerging trends and anticipated 
developments over the course of the next four years.
The qualitative and quantitative methods will be used 
to collect data already available at Europol for the 
purpose of analyses, information exchange or cross-
checking. This will be carried out in compliance with 
the applicable data protection safeguards. For instance, 
data on suspects contributed to Europol, information 
from supported investigations and operations as well as 
changes in the flow of operational data to Europol were 
used to obtain an indication of threats. This information 
has been combined with desk research based on 
Europol’s analysis reports (early warning notifications, 
intelligence notifications, threat assessments, situation 
reports) and other strategic reports developed by 
Europol,  EU partner agencies, Member States or non-EU 
countries and partners. This provides a current but not 
complete threat picture across the EU and assists with 
the development of EU intelligence requirements. 
Data collected internally was supplemented by external 
data collection. It is mandatory that all law enforcement 
and other relevant authorities of the EU Member States 
and relevant Justice and Home Affairs agencies 
contribute to the SOCTA. The qualitative and quantitative 
methods will be used to collect data from Member States 
and contributing partners using dedicated reporting 
templates. Information provided should originate from 
intelligence and ongoing or closed investigations and 
also reflect on emerging threats and national priorities.
There was one questionnaire per crime area (including 
break down crime areas). A reporting template has to 
be returned for every crime area, even if it is to report 
that the Member State has nothing to contribute to this 
crime area. Multidisciplinary input is crucial to achieve 
an integrated and integral approach and contributors are 
therefore encouraged to collect data from all available 
sources. However, Member States are requested to 
report nationally and therefore only one questionnaire per 
Member State is expected to be returned on each crime 
area. 
Specific questionnaires were sent out to relevant non-EU 
countries, EU agencies and international organisations 
or cooperation platforms, who are requested to report on 
links to the EU or at the EU level.
Other relevant actors including those involved in  the 
European multidisciplinary platform against criminal 
threats, EMPACT, within their respective mandated area 
and existing centres of expertise on serious 
70 A single indicator will never determine the overall threat.
and organised crime research (networks, academic 
institutions, global institutions and other centres of 
expertise) were invited to contribute.
Additional consultations, expert workshops or interviews 
were carried out with other EU agencies, academia 
or private sector representatives if needed to collect 
contextual or additional information. 
Open source information was collected to complement 
the information from dedicated contributions and 
operational information analysed for the SOCTA. Official 
statistical data was used where available and applicable. 
Open source information was used to illustrate case 
examples or collect contextual information that may 
be missing from criminal intelligence. The use of open 
source materials has been verified and approved as part 
of the review process.
THREAT INDICATORS AND CRIME 
RELEVANT FACTORS
The SOCTA is a present and future-oriented threat 
assessment based on qualitative and quantitative 
analysis. In order to assess the threats of serious 
and organised crime, sets of indicators are used for 
serious and organised crime areas, OCGs, impact, crime 
infrastructure and environment. A balanced combination 
of these features and the likelihood of change is crucial 
to reach conclusions and produce recommendations 
regarding key serious and organised crime threats(70).
Indicators can be either descriptive indicators or threat 
indicators. Descriptive indicators (D) are merely used to 
analyse and describe the current threat. Threat indicators 
(T) are additionally used to assess the current threat and 
to compare them on the basis of the same threshold.
It is important to note that, regarding the SOC area 
and OCG indicators, a clear distinction has to be made 
between: 
 • the scale of the indicator (unknown, nil, low, medium, 
high); 
 • the value (weight) of each separate indicator, which 
is necessary in order to combine the scores on all 
indicators into one threat score. 
 
For this purpose, a relative value (weight) is given to each 
of the OCG and SOC area threat indicators, determined 
by the SOCTA Advisory Group. The weights are also 
indicated as high (H), medium (M) or low (L).
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INDICATORS FOR ORGANISED CRIME 
GROUPS 
Nationality (D), Size of the group (D), Structure/type 
of the group and the cohesiveness (D), Sophistication 
of human resources (T), Geographical dimension and 
mobility (T), Continuity and resilience of the group (T), 
Financial resources (T), Other resources (D), Level of 
expertise (T), Crime areas (D), Modus operandi (D), Poly-
crime activities (D), Links to other OCGs (T), Adaptability/
flexibility (T), Turnover (T), Money laundering – level 
of sophistication (T), Use of legal business structures/
infrastructure (T), Countermeasures (T), External violence 
(T), Internal violence (D), Corruption (T).
INDICATORS FOR SERIOUS AND 
ORGANISED CRIME AREAS 
Modus operandi (D), Resource availability (T), Demand 
and supply (T), Evolution (T), Geographical distribution 
and displacement (T), Links to other crime areas (D), 
Number of OCGs/criminal groups active in the crime area 
(D), Nationality of the OCG members active in the crime 
area (D), Available expertise (T), Level of cooperation 
of the OCGs active in the crime area (T), Level of 
adaptability/flexibility of the OCGs active in the crime 
area (T), Money laundering – level of sophistication 
(T), Use of legal business structures (T), Level of 
countermeasures of the OCGs active in the crime area 
(T), External violence used by the OCGs active in the 
crime area (T), Level of corruption (T).
IMPACT INDICATORS 
Financial/economic impact (T), Social impact (T), Health 
impact (T), Security impact (T), Political impact (T), 
Impact on the environment (T).
The impact indicators are assessed in terms of volume, 
frequency and seriousness of the known effects, 
resulting in a high, medium, low, or unknown effect.
CRIME INFRASTRUCTURE INDICATORS
Use of legal business structures (T), Money laundering 
(T), Identity/document fraud (T), Corruption (T), 
Countermeasures (T), Modus operandi (D), Transport 
and trade infrastructure (D), Technology and digital 
infrastructure (D).
71 As proposed during the SOCTA 2017 evaluation: more focus on OCGs, improved geographical dimension and foresight.
This list can be completed with additional descriptive 
indicators, resulting from environmental scanning as 
validated by SOCTA Advisory Group.
ENVIRONMENT INDICATORS
Economic situation (D), Sociological situation (D), 
Geopolitical situation (D) (inside the EU; at the external 
borders of the EU; other countries outside the EU), 
Evolution of transport and trade infrastructure (D), 
Innovation and new technologies (D), Legislation 
(D), National strategies (D), Law enforcement 
activity (number of investigations, national priorities, 
participation in EMPACT OAP, budgetary changes, other 
challenges). (D)
Different aspects depending on crime area shall be taken 
into account additionally. This list can be completed with 
additional indicators, resulting from data collection and 
also from environmental scanning.
RESULTS
The analysis of the data on OCGs and serious and 
organised crime results in a list of recommended 
priorities on OCGs and serious and organised crime 
areas, in a format that enables informed decision-making 
on priorities.
The final SOCTA report will provide a detailed picture of 
current and future threats regarding crime areas, OCGs, 
and crime infrastructure, taking into account the impact 
and broader environment including the geographical 
aspects. Therefore, the SOCTA should be the key report 
for the development of recommendations(71) regarding 
serious and organised crime for the EU policy level. 
Additionally, the SOCTA should also inform regarding 
international serious and organised crime, including 
aspects such as poly-criminality.
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ARO Asset Recovery Office
ATM Automated Teller Machine
BEC Business Email Compromise 
CaaS Crime-as-a-Service
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
EC European Commission
EEA European Environmental Agency
EMCDDA European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
EMCS Excise Movement and Control System
ENISA European Union Agency for Cybersecurity
EU European Union 
EU SOCTA European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 
EUCARIS European Vehicle and Driving Licence Information System 
EUIPO European Union Intellectual Property Office
FADO False and Authentic Documents Online
FATF Financial Action Task Force 
GPS Global Positioning System
ICT Information Communication Technology
IOCTA Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment 
IOM International Organisation for Migration 
IoT Internet of Things
IPTV Internet Protocol Television 
IT Information Technology 
JHA Justice and Home Affairs
LE Law Enforcement  
LEA Law Enforcement Authority
MDMA Methylenedioxymethamphetamine
MOCG Mobile Organised Crime Groups
MTIC Missing Trader Intra-Community
NPS New Psychoactive Substance
OCG Organised Crime Group
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Your feedback matters. 
By clicking on the following link or scanning the embedded QR code you can fill in 
a short user survey on the received strategic report.  
 
Your input will help us further improve our products.
https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/runner/eus_strategic_reports
 

